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Report of the ICJ Mission of Inquiry Into
the Israeli Military Court System in the
Occupied West Bank and Gaza
By JORDAN J. PAUST
GERHARD VON GLAHN
GONTER WORATSCH*
PREFACE BY THE I.C.J.
At the request of AI-Haq, the International Commission of Jurists'
affiliate in the Israeli Occupied Territory in the West Bank, the Commis-
sion decided to send a mission to study the working of the military justice
system in the West Bank and Gaza.
We were fortunate in persuading three distinguished international
lawyers to undertake the mission, namely:
- Professor Jordan J. Paust, University of Houston Law Center,
Houston, Texas;
- Dr. Gerhard von Glahn, Professor Emeritus (Political Science),
University of Minnesota-Duluth, Duluth, Minnesota; and
- Mr. Justice Giinter Woratsch of the Federal Court of Appeals in
Vienna, Austria, and President of the International Association of
Judges.
We are deeply grateful to the participants for carrying out this mis-
sion for two weeks in June and July, 1989, and for the fair and objective
report they have prepared on this subject following an energetic and
strenuous mission.
The report is essentially a factual report on the justice system, in
most cases accompanied by conclusions and recommendations. When
they find practices which appear to them to violate international human
rights law, they state so clearly.
The participants are deeply concerned about the continuing reports
of mistreatment and torture of suspects during interrogation, and point
* This report was originally published by the International Commission of Jurists. It is
reprinted here in its original form with minor stylistic changes.
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out that this violates human rights and the law of war, and constitutes a
criminally sanctionable war crime.
They were also "deeply concerned" about the inability of defence
lawyers to visit their clients until after interrogation and the "confes-
sion." They recommend that "attorneys be given access to an accused at
an early date and that no person be held for more than forty-eight hours
without a judicial warrant or formal charges and access to a court." This
recommendation is in accordance with international penal law.
They were told that some ninety-five percent of alleged security of-
fenders "confess" and defence lawyers complained that most confessions
are the result of mistreatment or torture. The mission recommended
greater corroboration of confessions.
Defence attorneys also complain that the charges are often inade-
quate and they are unable to obtain details until the hearing of the plea
(if then), and some charge sheets are in a language the accused cannot
understand.
The mission made numerous recommendations for improving the
treatment of arrested persons in accordance with the Geneva Conven-
tions and other international law.
Other subjects on which the mission made recommendations include
family visits, review and dismissal by the prosecutor, bail, hearing on
pleas, sentencing on guilty pleas, the newly created Military Appeals
Court, the role of the Supreme Court, administrative detention (i.e.,
without charge or trial), and quasi-judicial tribunals.
The International Commission of Jurists is deeply grateful to the
Ford Foundation Cairo Office for funding this project.
Niall MacDermot
Secretary-General
International Commission of Jurists
December, 1989
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1. BACKGROUND OF THE MISSION
On 12 February 1989, A1-Haq (Law in the Service of Man), the
West Bank affiliate of the International Commission of Jurists based in
Geneva, Switzerland, requested the Secretary-General of the Interna-
tional Commission to organize a mission to the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip. The mission was to study and report on the military justice system
in the occupied territories in question. The stated reason for the request
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was the deterioration observed in the operation of the military court sys-
tem, particularly since the onset of the Intifada (Uprising) on 9 Decem-
ber 1987. The Secretary-General approved the above request and on 26
May announced the composition of the mission:
Professor Jordan J. Paust, University of Houston Law Center, Hous-
ton, Texas;
Dr. Gerhard von Glahn, Professor Emeritus (Political Science), Uni-
versity of Minnesota-Duluth, Duluth, Minnesota; and
Mr. Justice Giinter Woratsch, Federal Court of Appeals, Vienna, Aus-
tria, and President of the International Association of Judges.
The mission spent two weeks (from 25 June to 9 July 1989) in the
West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and Israel; it was based in East Jerusalem. A
large part of the local arrangements, appointments, and documentation
services was supplied by the Al-Haq staff or set up by phone contacts
with Israeli officials, especially the Deputy Legal Adviser in the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.
2. OBJECT OF THE MISSION
Secretary-General Niall MacDermot of the International Commis-
sion of Jurists defined the mandate of the mission by letter (26 May 1989)
to each member of the mission as "to study and report on the military
justice system in the occupied territories in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip." The precise scope of the study undertaken was determined by
consultation among the members of the mission and with the Secretary-
General and Mr. Raja Shehadeh, Co-Director of Al-Haq.
Members of the mission agreed that the study of the military court
system in the Israeli-occupied territories should include an analysis of
applicable international law instruments; appropriate references in the
body of this report to adherence to or violation of rules laid down in such
instruments, as found in the operations of the court system; and a cover-
age of the practice of administrative detention (viewed as being associ-
ated with the formal military court system).
3. METHODS UTILIZED BY THE MISSION
A major source of information was lengthy trial observations in mil-
itary courts in Ramallah, Nablus, and Gaza City. On each of seven
mornings either two or three of us witnessed hearings or trials in the
courts, accompanied by trilingual interpreters supplied by Al-Haq (Law
in the Service of Man). In addition to observations, we discussed proce-
[Vol. 14
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dures and problems with military judges, military prosecutors, and Pales-
tinian defense lawyers involved in the observed proceedings.
We interviewed, and in a few cases were briefed by, the Advocate
General of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and his international law
section chief; the Legal Advisers for the West Bank and for the Gaza
Strip (including members of their staff); the Presidents of the Military
Courts in Gaza, Nablus, and Ramallah; the President of the new Mili-
tary Appeals Court; the President of Israel's High Court of Justice; sev-
eral military judges in Ramallah, Nablus, and Gaza; military prosecutors
in Gaza and Ramallah; the commander of the military prison in Gaza
(known as Ansar 2), several members of his command, and three Pales-
tinian juveniles held in the prison; representatives of the Quakers' Legal
Aid, of the Israeli Association for Civil Rights (ACRI), of the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), of the Arab Lawyers Com-
mittee in the West Bank and the Gaza Bar Association, and of Arab
lawyers who had been on strike since the start of the occupation in 1967;
several Arab defense lawyers in Ramallah, Nablus, and Gaza; a number
of Palestinian ex-detainees; and in particular staff members of Al-Haq,
the West Bank affiliate of the International Commission of Jurists. The
Al-Haq office in Ramallah also supplied us with a massive accumulation
of printed and typed material, including key military orders, the Israeli
"Landau Report" on certain practices found to exist in military interro-
gation procedures, reports by active as well as by striking Arab defense
lawyers, numerous Al-Haq publications, and the texts of certain relevant
international agreements. The final two days of our mission were de-
voted to developing a detailed outline of this report and to allocating to
the individual members of the mission responsibility for drafting specific
sections of this report after reaching their home bases.
4. THE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
APPLICABLE TO MILITARY COURTS DURING
BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION
The rules applicable to belligerent occupation have been developed
over the past ninety years and today form an important segment of inter-
national humanitarian law. Among the instruments that we accept as
standards by which to evaluate the Israeli military court system, we
deem two to be especially important: the Regulations annexed to the
1907 Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land (hereafter cited as Regulations) and the Fourth Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
War, of 12 August 1949 (G.C.). The most pertinent parts of the Regula-
tions are Articles 42-56, in particular Articles 42 and 43, the latter refer-
ring to the law-making authority of a military occupant.
We agree with most states as well as the Israeli courts that the Reg-
ulations are a part of customary international law.I As such, their provi-
sions represent binding obligations on all states and belligerents. The
cited provisions above therefore apply to the territories "occupied" by
Israel within the meaning of customary international law reflected in Ar-
ticle 42 of the annex to the 1907 Hague Convention, which states: "Ter-
ritory is considered occupied when it is placed under the authority of the
hostile army." These territories include the West Bank and Gaza.
The 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention (G.C.) also applies to the Is-
raeli-occupied territories. The applicability of the G.C. to the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip has been affirmed by the United Nations,2 the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross,3 and most states.4
The Israeli government ratified the G.C. on 10 April 1951, but from
the beginning of the 1967 military occupations, profoundly different in-
terpretations were expressed by Israel's government and the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross (and many slates) concerning the
applicability of the G.C. to the Israeli-occupied tenitories. Israel's posi-
1. See, eg., Jamyat Askhan al-Ma'alim v. The IDF Commander in the Judea and Sama-
ria Region, P.D. 37 (4) 785, 793 (Israel High Court of Justice 1982, H.C. 393/82); Dvikat V.
Government of Israel P.D. 34 (1) 1 (H.C. 390/79, 61/80); Ayob v. Minister of Defence, P.D.
33(2) 113, 120 (H.C. 606/78, 610/78); Hilu v. Government of Israel, P.D. 27 (2) 169, 180
(H.C. 302/72, H.C. 306/72); and The Attorney General v. Sylvester, I Psakim Elionim 513
(Sup. Ct. Israel, Cr. App. 1/48) (to the effect that the 1907 Hague Convention is customary
international law). See also R. SHEHADEH, OCCUPIER'S LAW-ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK
(rev. ed. 1988), at xiii and the cases cited in n.9 therein; Pach, Human Rights in West Bank
Military Courts, 7 ISRAEL Y.B. OF HUMAN RIGHTS 222, 228-29 (197T).
2. See, eg., U.N. S.C. Res. 607, 5 January 1988 (which reaffirmed that the G.C. was
applicable to Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including
East Jerusalem); U.N. G.A. Res. 3092 (1973); and, most recently, a statement by U.N. Secre-
tary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar (29 June 1989) in which he referred to the deportation of
eight Palestinians from occupied areas as "a clear violation of the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion," Jerusalem Post, 30 June 1989, at 1. See also Bisharat, Palestine and Humanitarian Law:
Israeli Practice in the West Bank and Gaza, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 325, 340,
343-44 (1989), and references cited.
3. See, e.g., ICRC, ANNUAL REPORT, at 83-84 (Geneva 1987); ICRC, THE ICRC
WORLDWIDE 1988, at 18 (Geneva 1989); ICRC, BULLETIN NO. 160, at I (Geneva, May
1989).
4. See, eg., U.S. Dep't of State, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES
FOR 1988 (Feb. 1989) [hereinafter cited as 1989 U.S. COUNTRY REPORT]; see also the 1987
edition of the same publication, at 1189, where the Department of State had asserted that the
United States "recognizes Israel as an occupying power" and in consequence considers its rule
in the territories "to be subject to the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the 1949 Fourth Geneva
Convention.. . ." See also 61 DEP'T OF ST. BULL. 76 (U.S., 28 July 1969).
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tion was and continues to be that the wording of the G.C. did not lead to
its applicability to every situation of belligerent occupation, specifically
not to territory that had not been under the sovereignty of another High
Contracting Party.5 On the other hand, Israel has stated repeatedly that
the "humanitarian provisions" of the G.C. would be observed.6 We have
been unable to locate any formal official Israeli statement as to the pre-
cise nature of these humanitarian provisions, but the entire G.C. is held
by the ICRC and most states to be a part of the humanitarian law of war.
Nonetheless, when questioned by members of the mission, the Advocate
General of the IDF admitted that Articles 47-78 of the G.C. are among
its relevant "humanitarian provisions," and he added that these were be-
ing applied or complied with by the IDF.
It appears obvious to members of the mission that territory not be-
longing to a state but newly controlled and occupied by its armed forces
during an armed conflict of an international character is "occupied" ter-
ritory within the meaning of customary international law. In the situa-
tion under consideration, even if the West Bank and the Gaza Strip had
been merely areas occupied by other states prior to the 1967 war, they
would still be occupied territories within the meaning of both customary
law and the G.C. (and any customary portions thereof).
The second paragraph of Article 2 of the G.C. does not pose owner-
ship as a stated qualification where reference is made to "territory of a
High Contracting Party." Paragraph 2 may thus include occupied terri-
tory of such a party, and perhaps territorial possessions, trust territories,
administered territory, or a mandated territory. More importantly, the
second paragraph of Article 2 of the G.C. (with or without any supposed
distinction among territories) is merely an alternative to paragraph one
of Article 2, either of which acts as a threshold "for the entry into force
of the Convention." 8 As Mr. Jean Pictet noted in his authoritative com-
ment, the second paragraph "was intended to fill the gap left by para-
5. See, e-g., M. SHAMGAR, LEGAL CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS OF THE ISRAELI MILI-
TARY GOVERNMENT-THE INITIAL STAGES, 13, 32-33; MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE
TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 1967-1980, THE LEGAL ASPECTS (M. Shamgar ed.
1982), Jerusalem: Hebrew University Faculty of Law; Bisharat, supra note 2, at 337, 339.
6. See, eg., M. Shamgar (then Attorney-General of Israel), The Observance of Interna-
tional Law in the Administered Territories, I ISRAEL Y.B. ON HuMAN RIGHTS 262 (1971).
7. See also INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS (August 1970), 426-27
("where a territory under the authority of one of the parties passes under the authority of an
opposing party, there is 'occupation' within the meaning of Article 2"); Bisharat, supra note 2,
at 337-38 & nn.69, 72; Dinstein, Judgment ofPithat Raflah, 3 EYUNAI M1SHPAT (Legal Stud-
ies) 934, 938 (1978) (G.C. is not contingent on recognition of property rights).
8. See JEAN PICTET, IV COMMENTARY, GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE
PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR, 21 (1958).
1990]
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graph one" and "does not refer to cases in which territory is occupied
during hostilities... [but] only refers to cases where the occupation has
taken place.., without hostilities." 9 With respect to "territory. .. occu-
pied during hostilities," he added, "in such cases the Convention will
have been in force since the outbreak of hostilities... and any occupation
carried out in wartime is covered by paragraph 1.""° Stressing that "[n]o
loophole is left," Pictet noted further: "In all cases of occupation,
whether carried out by force or without meeting any resistance, the Con-
vention becomes applicable to individuals."'"
We also note that there is no distinction in the :Fourth Geneva Con-
vention between hostilities (or belligerent occupations) that are defensive
or offensive, just or unjust, nonaggressive or aggressive.12 It is also im-
portant to note that it is the applicability of such international laws gov-
erning occupation that authorizes certain powers for the occupying
forces that they would not otherwise possess.' 3 If rights of the popula-
tion are not legally effective, then it cannot be that the exercise of occu-
pying powers is legally permissible or effective. Legally, the two must
coincide. They reflect a complimentarity of purpose and legal policies at
stake. 14
It has been asserted, concerning the subject matter of our study, that
It has from the very first been the declared policy of the State of Israel
that its military and civil organs abide by the humanitarian provisions
of the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949
as if they were binding and applicable. And whenever the question
arose in the courts of Israel ... the position invariably taken by the
9. Id. at 21-22 (emphasis added).
10. Id. (emphasis added). See also id. at 22 (application "to territories which are occupied
at a later date, in virtue of... a capitulation ... [follows] from paragraph 1").
11. Id. at 60 (emphasis added). See also Bisharat, supra note 2, at 338.
12. See, eg., G.C., Art. 1 ("undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present
Convention in all circumstances"), Art. 2 ("shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any
other armed conflict which may arise"); see PICTET, supra note 8, at 13-17. The norms are not
merely contractual or of an ordinary nature, but are obligatio erga; all other signatories if not
also customary are obligatio erga omnes. See PIcTET, id. That much of Geneva Protocol I is
customary, see, e.g., W. T. MALLISON, THE PALESTINE PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND WORLD ORDER 400, n.437 (1986); panel, Customary Law and Additional Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions for Protection of War Victims, 81 PROC., AM. SOC. INT'L L. (1987) (rc-
marks of Meron, Carnahan, Matheson).
13. See, eg., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PAMPHLET NO. 27-161-2, II INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 159, 165, 169 (1962). These powers include the power to operate a military
justice system.
14. See, in general, M. MCDOUGAL AND F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER 739-41, 745-46, 766-67, 790-91, 793-94, 796-800, 808 (1961); G. VON GLAHN,
THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY: A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE
OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 33-34 (1957).
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government and by the military commanders was that those provisions
of the Hague Regulations and of the Geneva Convention should be
followed. 5
Furthermore, General Staff Order No. 33.0133 (20 July 1982) commands
that "[a]ll IDF soldiers are required to act in accordance with the provi-
sions included in" the Geneva Conventions. 6 It therefore appears that
all military prosecutors and judges, as well as commanders, are under
orders to comply with and to assure compliance with Articles 47-78 of
the Fourth Geneva Convention, and that they are not to take any action
inconsistent with the provisions of that instrument.
Israeli courts have also applied provisions of the G.C. as standards
authorizing certain powers exercised by Israel in the occupied territo-
ries, 7 but, on the other hand, several Israeli courts have refused to apply
rights under the Fourth Geneva Convention.'
In view of what has been noted above, Israel also appears to be es-
topped to deny the applicability of the humanitarian law of war as set
forth in the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention of
15. See H. COHN, foreword, in THE RULE OF LAW IN THE AREAS ADMINITERE BY
ISRAEL, vii-viii (Israel National Section of the International Commission of Jurists, 1981); see
also id at 1; M. Shamgar, supra note 6; ISRAEL (SECURITY) PROCLAMATION No. 3, Art. 35
(1967); 1989 U.S. COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 4. See also infra note 18; but see Hilu v.
Government of Israel, P.D. 27 (2) 169, 180 (H.C. 302/72, 206/72).
16. Section 3, quoted in Hillel Somer, The Application of the Fourth Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949, as Israeli Law, 11 EYUNAI
MiSHPAT (Legal Studies) 263 (1986). Somer quoted the Chief Military Advocate of the IDF
as stating: "The Geneva Convention is one of the orders of the army and its provisions have
been adapted in. .. appendix 61 of the general staff orders." Id at 268.
17. See, eg., Military Prosecutor v. Haili Muhamad Hal Bakhis and Others, Israel Mili-
tary Court in Ramallah (1968), 47 I.L.R. 484, 485-86 (1974); Military Prosecutor v. Raid
Salman el Hassan el Hatib, Israel Military Court in Ramallah (1968), 47 I.LR. 487, 488-89
(1974), quoted in Israel National Section of the I.C.J., supra note 15, at 28. See also Abu
Awad v. The Regional Commander of Judea and Samaria, P.D. 33 (3) 309 (H.C. 97/79);
Blum, The Missing Reversioner Reflections on the Status of Judea and Samaria, 3 ISRAEL L
REv. 279, 280-81 (1969). Butsee Jerusalem Region Electricity Co. v. The Minister of Energy,
P.D. 35 (2) 673 (H.C. 351/80), and Dvikat v. Government of Israel, P.D. 34 (1) 1, 29 (H.C.
390/79).
18. See, eg., Ibrahim Sagidia and Others v. Minister of Defence, Israel High Court of
Justice, 258/88, App. H. Ct. J. 323/88 (1988); Suliman v. Minister of Defence, Israel High
Court of Justice, P.D. 33 (2) 113 (1979); Military Prosecutor v. Hall Muhamed Hall Bakhis
and Others, supra note 17, 47 I.L.R. at 486. See also the Jamyat Askham al-Ma'alim case,
supra note 1, at 793, and Dvikat v. Government of Israel, P.D. 34 (1) 29 (H.C. 390/79),
opinion of Witkon, J.: the G.C. "does apply... even though it is not within thejurisdiction of
this court" as mere treaty law not based also in legislation. See also Qawassmah et &1. v.
Minister of Defence, P.D. 35(1) 617, 627 (H.C. 698/80), in which Cohen, J. attempted in his
dissent to apply the G.C. Article 49 as part of customary international law.
19Mo
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We wish to point out that certain other international instruments
will be mentioned in this report because they repeat or reinforce the stan-
dards set forth in the Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention of
1949 for the operations of a military court system under belligerent occu-
pation (even though Israel is not a party to all of the agreements in ques-
tion). Among these additional instruments are the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (1948), now regarded by many commentators as hav-
ing acquired the status of customary international law and, at a mini-
mum, as reflecting the basic human rights norms referred to in
obligations set forth in Articles 55(c) and 56 of the U.N. Charter (which
Israel has ratified); the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights, signed but not ratified by Israel;2  the 1969 American Con-
vention on Human Rights; the 1950 European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; the 1981 Afri-
can (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights; and the 1977 Pro-
tocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I), of which Israel is not a party (a listing of the relevant provi-
sions of the foregoing international instruments, as they relate to the sub-
jects of our investigation, is found in the text and footnotes to this
report).
While it is true that Israel has not become a party to all of the above
international agreements, we agree that their relevant provisions, espe-
cially when they coincide, represent international standards by which, in
the present instance, many aspects of the operations of a military court
system under occupation can be evaluated. At a minimum, they are use-
ful juridic aids for interpreting the evolving content of custom and the
due process guarantees of the Geneva Conventions and human rights
guaranteed by the U.N. Charter.
19. On estoppel, see generally Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), I.C.L 253 (1974); cf
Rubin, The International Legal Effects of Unilateral Declarations, 71 AM. J. INT'L LAW 1
(1977).
20. We note also that a signatory must take no action inconsistent with the main purposes
of a treaty awaiting ratification. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22,
1969, art. 18, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, at 289 (1969). One of the main purposes of a
human rights treaty obviously is to assure the protection of human rights, and a signator at a
minimum, must not itself deny such rights or allow their violation. Thus, we consider Israel to
be bound not to deny relevant due process guarantees contained in the 1966 Covenant,
[Vol. 14
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5. THE ISRAELI MILITARY COURT SYSTEM IN THE
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
A. Origin and Structure
A belligerent occupant is entitled by Article 66 of the Fourth Ge-
neva Convention of 1949 to establish "properly constituted, non-political
military courts" to enforce regulations in territory under his belligerent
occupation.21 This right was well-established in international law and
practice long before the 1949 Diplomatic Conference which drafted the
Fourth Geneva Convention.'
The establishment of military courts and the publication of penal
provisions are sanctioned under international law as methods by which a
military occupant enforces law and order in occupied territory. The mil-
itary courts operated by Israel in the occupied territories of the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip were founded in part on the Defence (Emer-
gency) Regulations issued by the British Mandate Government in Pales-
tine in 1945 and, to a far greater extent, in the Israel Proclamation No.
3 and its annexed Security Provisions Order (SPO), issued by the respec-
tive Area Commanders. That initial Order has since been amended and
expanded by over a thousand Military Orders (MOs). Among the latter,
Military Order No. 378, West Bank (1970) and its counterpart for the
Gaza Strip possess particular importance. The MOs are not published by
the occupation authorities in an official gazette or in the press. They are
distributed, sometimes quite long after their date of issue, to lawyers on
what has been claimed to be a limited scale. Inasmuch as many MOs
represent amendments to earlier ones, it seemed to us that it would be
difficult for persons not members of the IDF to trace regulations issued
on a specific topic.
21. The G.C., in its Articles 67-78, contains specific rules for the operation of such mili-
tary courts.
22. See, e.g., GRABER, DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION-
1863-1914, 119, 140, 150-52, 273-76 (1949); OPPENHEIM, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAw 347 (Lau-
terpacht's 6th ed., 1940); SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND 357-59 (1911); GARNER, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND THE WORLD WAR 85-87 (1920); NOBLEMAN, MILITARY
GOVERNMENT CouRTs IN GERMANY (1953).
23. We do not take sides concerning the controversy whether the British Regulations re-
mained in effect, were void ab initio, or were voided by the British. On such a question, see,
e.g., R. SHEHADEH, OCCUPIER's LAw, supra note 1, at xiv-xv. Further, such regulations were
prior to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and developments in human rights law in
the 1960s, 70s, and 80s, and were also prior to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. In case of any
inconsistency, the requirements, rights, and duties under internationa law will, in any event,
prevail. See, eg., U.N. Charter, art. 103 (in connection with arts. 55(c) & 56); G.C. arts. 1, 2,
148; See Pictet, supra note 8, at 15-18, 592, 602-03; Principles of the Nuremberg Charter and
Judgment, prins. II & IV, 5 GAOR, Supp. 12, at 11-14, para. 99, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950).
1990]
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The lack of prompt and adequate publication in the local language
appears to us to be a clear violation of G.C. Article 65, which reads:
"The penal provisions enacted by the Occupying Power shall not come
into force before they have been published and brought to the knowledge
of the inhabitants in their own language." Similarly, we feel that Section
3 of Military Order No. 225 (1968), which states that "[i]gnorance of the
law or [a] security enactment does not afford any excuse," is incompati-
ble with the requirement of G.C. Article 65 that such provisions be
"brought to the knowledge of the inhabitants in their own language."
B. Military Courts of First Instance24
Israel's military court system in the West Bank and Gaza operated,
at the time of our visit, on two levels created by MOs: the military courts
(courts of first instance) and the new Military Appeals Court. The
Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court of Justice, had to be
considered as a relatively seldom used apex of the system, but was, of
course, not created as such by any MO.
Military courts of first instance (hereafter military courts) operated
in Nablus, Ramallah, and Gaza City, with satellite courts (open several
days each week) in Jenin, Hebron, Kalkilya, and Tulkarem. At the di-
rection of the President of the Courts, court sessions could also be held
elsewhere. In general, the courts in Nablus and Gaza City seemed to be
more formal than the one-judge court in Ramallah. Despite years of oc-
cupation, the courtroom used by a single judge in Ramallah seemed to be
a temporary building with little space for witnesses, the typical rows of
ten or twenty accused brought in from buses or the tents, and the two or
more remaining rows for the few family members allowed inside the gate
and then inside the courtroom. Although prosecutors and judges wore
casual uniforms, defense counsel were under orders to wear formal attire
beneath long, black judicial robes, making their attire far more inappro-
priate in summer and in non-air-conditioned buildings. The holding ar-
eas for accused in Ramallah and Nablus are crowded, but seem humane
compared to the dark cell-like room in the Gaza City military court area.
The military courts are empowered to try all offenses connected
with security as defined in MOs. Military Order No. 3781 of 1970, as
amended (Order Concerning Security Instructions--Judea and Samaria)
lists more than thirty specific security offenses subject to the jurisdiction
24. On Israeli military courts in general, see THE RULE OF LAW IN THE AREAS
ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL (Israel National Section of the IC.J., 1981), 27-33; Pach, supra
note 1, at 222-51; AL-HAQ & GAZA CENTRE FOR RIGHTS AND LAW, JUSTICE-THE
MILITARY COURT SYSTEM IN THE ISRAELI-OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (Feb. 1987).
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of the military courts. Some of the offenses listed appear to be above
criticism, dealing with security problems encountered quite probably by
any belligerent occupying force. Others however, in our view, contain
such overly-broad language that enforcement could embrace a wide spec-
trum of indigenous and permissible activity. An early example, found in
Military Order No. 101, of 27 August 1967, prohibits "a congregation of
ten people or more in a place where a speech is heard on a political sub-
ject or on a subject which can be interpreted as a political subject or who
are gathered for the purpose of deliberating on such a subject." Accord-
ing to one Palestinian lawyer, a judge of the Military Court in Ramallah
once remarked that a large Palestinian family, of over ten persons dis-
cussing politics at the dinner table, would be violating the MO in ques-
tion. Military Order No. 378 (1970) also prohibits "insulting behavior"
toward any IDF soldier (Article 65) and contains the overly-broad prohi-
bition of "any act likely to disturb the peace or public order" (Article
68).
In addition to security offenses, the military courts may try criminal
offenses that may become security offenses, such as non-prevention of
offenses, threats, distributing pamphlets, inciting to riots, providing false
information, or disobeying a military commander's order to supply infor-
mation. The courts may also deal with offenses affecting the military
justice system directly, such as escape from legal custody, pejury, disor-
derly behavior in court, failure to answer a summons to appear in court,
and contempt of court.
The jurisdiction (and apparently a significant caseload) of the mili-
tary courts also includes a number of economic offenses, including failure
to make prescribed payments (including income taxes) to the occupation
authorities, bribery of public officials, customs fraud, negligent damage
to governmental or military property, as well as procuring and trading in
military equipment. There exist also certain specific offenses linked to
security that are tried in the military courts: looting (cf. G.C. Art. 33),
entering or leaving a specified area without a permit, incitement and hos-
tile propaganda, illegal contacts, and the illegal closing of businesses dur-
ing political strikes.' It can be seen that several of the above categories
are again of a nature which permits rather broad interpretation by a mili-
tary judge and significant potential for misuse and abuse.
The courts of first instance may also deal with a large group of of-
fenses based on the occupant's right and duty under the Hague Regula-
tions of 1907 to restore and to ensure the "civil life" (la vie publique) as
25. On all of these categories, see Pach, supra note 1, at 245-47.
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required by Article 43 of the Regulations. Examples of this kind ofjuris-
diction, as defined in a number of MOs, are Preservation of Holy Places
(Military Order No. 163), Abandoned Property (Military Order No. 58),
Traffic Law (Military Order No. 399, as amended), and Parks (Military
Order No. 373).
Technically, the military courts have jurisdiction over all criminal
cases. According to Article 2 of the Jurisdiction in Criminal Offences
Order (as amended) of 25 June 1967: "A Military Court shall be compe-
tent to try any criminal offence in accordance with the laws in force at
the time such offence was committed, whether the offence was committed
before or after the Israel Defence Forces entered the Region." Article 3
of that Order reads: "Every criminal offence shall be deemed to be an
offence against the Security Provisions Order, whether or not jurisdiction
to try such offence is exclusive to a particular court or tribunal."
Finally, courts of first instance may shift a trial for a claimed secur-
ity offense from a local Palestinian court to the jurisdiction of the mili-
tary courts. We were told by several defense lawyers that such decisions
to remove a case from a local court were reportedly based on unpub-
lished internal guidelines existing within the military court system and
that such guidelines were based, in turn, on policy directives of the Gen-
eral Security Service (the Shin Bet). On the other hand we were told by
one military judge that such transfers of cases from local courts to the
military courts were extremely rare. The matter can be summarized as
follows: the military courts have concurrent jurisdiction with local Pales-
tinian courts in criminal cases in general, but enjoy exclusive jurisdiction
in all instances in which a security question is invoked. In an undisclosed
manner, knowledge of what could be classified as security violations
coming into the local courts reaches the military system in time to have
the case in question moved into the jurisdictional sphere of the latter.
The entire procedure appears to be in conformity with G.C. Article 66,
even though several defense lawyers decried it as an illegal interference
with the work of the local courts.
According to the Advocate General of the II)F, as quoted in the
Jerusalem Post of 12 June 1989, the military courts tried over 13,000
residents of the occupied territories between the beginning of the Intifada
(Uprising) on 8 December 1987 and 11 June 1989.
It should be kept in mind that while the jurisdiction of the military
courts technically includes Israeli citizens, in practice it does not. Under
Israeli law, Israeli citizens are under the law of their country even if re-
siding in the occupied territories or committing offenses therein. Those
individuals are tried in Israel by domestic courts under domestic law.
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Similarly, members of the Israeli Defense Forces who commit offenses in
the occupied territories are tried by courts-martial in Israel.
C. The Military Appeals Court
A Military Appeals Court became a part of the Israeli military court
system on 1 April 1989 through the provisions of Military Order No.
1265 (Order Regarding Security Instructions-Amendment No. 58, of 1
January 1989). The establishment of this court appears to have been the
result of years of effort by Arab lawyers to fill an important gap in the
military court system. The actual creation of the Appeals Court, we
were informed, was the result of a High Court of Justice ruling on a
petition by an East Jerusalem lawyer (Darwish Nasser) who had asked
the Court to instruct the IDF to establish a court of appeal.
The new court, which sits alternately in Ramallah and Gaza, will
only hear cases involving sentences in excess of five years imprisonment.
Persons convicted by a single-judge military court must petition to have
their appeal heard, while those convicted by a three-judge court may ap-
peal directly. The President of the Court serves as chairman of any panel
on which he sits; if he is not on the bench, he told us, he selects another
career legally-trained judge to serve as chairman, and his deputy gener-
ally hears cases in Gaza.
The Military Appeals Court sits as a court of three, except: (1) if
the sentence being appealed is a death sentence; (2) if the President of the
Court so decides; or (3) if the Chief Military Prosecutor considers that
there is a need for a larger bench. In those instances, a five-judge bench
will be used. (See also below for details on the early operations of the
Military Appeals Court.)
D. Judges
The judges serving in military courts are either regular (career) or
reserve officers in the IDF called up for service to fill the office of judge.
In the Military Courts (of first instance) lesser offenses are handled in
one-judge courts staffed by an officer trained in the law; serious offenses
are tried in three-judge courts staffed by at least one legally qualified
judge and one or two other IDF officers. Two full-time career judges are
assigned to each of the three permanent Military Courts in Ramallah,
Nablus, and Gaza, one serves as Chief Justice (or President) of the
Court, the other as Chief Military Prosecutor. There are, in addition,
five or six judges who are in the reserves. Prosecution before any military
court is conducted by a military prosecutor, legally qualified, who be-
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longs to the Advocate General section of the IDF. He, too, may be
either a career or reserve officer. In addition to judges and prosecutors,
military courts are staffed by clerks (military) and by translators/inter-
preters (military). The latter are discussed briefly in a subsequent por-
tion of this report.
As far as the new Military Appeals Court is concerned, judges are
similar in military status and legal training to the judges in the military
courts. The President of the Appeals Court informed us that in a three-
judge court, at least two of the judges must be trained in the law and that
in a five-judge tribunal, at least three judges must be so trained. All these
judges, just like those in the military courts, can be removed by the Com-
mander of the IDF; the President of the Military Appeals Court insisted
that no such removal had taken place since the beginning of the occupa-
tion in 1967. He also stated that the lowest rank of any military judge is
Major, involving then at least ten years of service in various legal
assignments.
One question raised on several occasions by Arab defense lawyers
dealt with the independence of the military judges. The lawyers in ques-
tion expressed doubts that such independence existed, in view of the mili-
tary status of the judges who, without any doubt, were serving as officers
in the IDF. The lawyers maintained that military officers, bound to en-
force and apply military regulations laid down in the MOs, could not be
expected to be independent in fulfilling their judicial duties. On the other
hand, a number of the military officials (including judges) with whom we
raised this issue insisted equally strenuously that they were indeed able to
act with independence as professionals, adding that no authority gave
them any advice on decisions. The President of the new Military Ap-
peals Court stated that in his view that court assisted in protecting the
independence of military court judges by being able to send a given case
back to the court of first instance in question for purposes of a rehearing.
He also stated that it was his belief that the military judges retained their
independence, even though all of them were connected administratively
with the office of the Military Advocate General of the IDF. Prosecu-
tors, however, do not act independently, but follow the advice and orders
of their superiors within the Advocate General's chain of command.
Two of the members of the mission felt that there was another prob-
lem connected with the employment of reserve officers as military judges;
this, however, by oversight, was not put by them to the judges inter-
viewed. The problem was related to the obvious fact that the reserve or
lawyer-judges performing their required duties had been, in many cases,
engaged in the practice of law other than criminal, while the bulk of the
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cases tried in the military courts had to do with security matters, Le.,
criminal matters as far as the military forces were concerned. Hence the
question arose: did the legal training (both within and outside of the mili-
tary) and practical experience of the reserve officer/lawyer in a noncrimi-
nal sphere of law suffice to enable him to function effectively as a
reservist judge in essentially criminal law cases? Personally, we found no
military lawyer or judge to be of questionable competence and we were
generally impressed with the level of competence of those that we met.
Further, as noted by the Advocate General and confirmed (at least in
part) by other officers, all military judges must be approved by a special
committee (composed of members of the Israeli Parliament, the High
Court and the Israeli Bar Association) and the Advocate General (who is
himself appointed by the Minister of Justice, not the Minister of
Defence).
6. ARRESTS
Military Order No. 378 allows any Israeli soldier to arrest any per-
son who has committed or is suspected of having committed any "secur-
ity offense."26 Functionally, such an arrest can occur without an initial
warrant and can last for a period of eighteen days before it is extended by
a military judge. Under the military order, any arrestee can be held
without a warrant for up to four days and the period of detention can be
extended for another seven days upon the "warrant" of a police officer,
who can merely assert that an "investigation" is in progress. If needed,
another police officer "warrant" can extend the period of detention an-
other seven days (for a total of eighteen days from the time of arrest). A
military judge must approve extensions of detention beyond the initial
eighteen day period, but the military judge can extend detention without
charges for a period of six months. This extension "hearing" can take
place in the jail or in a prison facility. It appears that most Palestinians
arrested in the occupied territories are arrested by the military. Further,
most of those arrested for security offenses have been arrested at the
scene of a disturbance or nearby, in their homes during the night, or in
military compounds after having been summoned for questioning."
According to Israeli sources, more than 35,000 persons have been
arrested for security offenses in the occupied territories since the begin-
26. Military Order Concerning Security Instructions No. 378 (1970), art. 78(A).
27. See AI-Haq, Briefing Paper No. 12 (11 May 1988); see also AL-HAQ, supra note 24, at
7; AL-HAQ, PUNISHING A NATION-HuMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS DURING THE PALESTIN-
IAN UPRISING 328 (American ed. 1988) [hereinafter cited as PUNISHING A NATION].
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ning of the Intifada in December 1987.28 Most of those arrested for se-
curity offenses have been young Palestinian males and the most common
offense seems to involve stone throwing, a breach of public order. The
age of criminal responsibility under Israeli law, which has been extended
to the territories, is twelve, although it appeared to members of the mis-
sion that most minors accused or convicted of security offenses were
males from fourteen to eighteen years of age. Apparently, all women
detainees are incarcerated inside Israel because of a claimed absence of
suitable facilities in the occupied territories.
In Gaza City, the commander of the prison camp known as Ansar 2
stated that in that facility there were some 110 persons from fifteen to
sixteen years of age, some thirty of whom were serving their sentences in
the prison tents. Members of the mission interviewed three such persons.
All of the fifteen to sixteen year-olds were together and were separated
from adults, with the exception of one or two adult prisoner supervisors,
although pre-trial and sentenced detainees were not separated. 29 The
prison camp commander in Gaza also stated that they were receiving
some ten to fifteen persons per day. In Gaza, members of the mission
also saw the sentencing of a young person who had plead guilty to acts of
stone throwing and tire burning when the accused had been thirteen
years old (at the start of the Intifada in December 1987).
According to the Legal Adviser for the West Bank, there were some
5200 persons being held, mostly in tents, when members of the mission
visited his office. Some 850 were said to be prisoners serving their
sentences, and there were some 1500 administrative detainees (held with-
out charges). Different figures were provided by other military person-
nel, although they did not appear to include administrative detainees.
The President of the Military Appeals Courts for the West Bank and
Gaza, sitting in Ramallah, stated that there were some 3500 persons ar-
rested and awaiting trial in the West Bank. The Advocate General of the
Israeli Defence Forces indicated that there were some 3500 persons de-
tained in a pre-trial phase and some 7000 persons in a "trial" phase. The
President of the Military Courts in Gaza added that they had finished
1500 cases in the last six months. Reflecting earlier figures, the 1989 U.S.
28. The ICRC reports that they have visited more than 40,000 "detainees" since the end
of 1987. See ICRC, Bulletin No. 163, at 3 (Aug. 1989).
29. Military Order No. 132 (West Bank Region), sec. 3, does not require such separation
from adults in all cases. Such separation ii required, however, under Article 10 (2) (b) of the
1966 Covenant. See also 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, art. 5(5). Of further
interest are Article 76 of the G.C. and the 1959 Declaration of the Rights of the Child, U.N.
G.A. res. (20 Nov. 1959).
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Country Report cited an IDF accounting of "5,656 Palestinians being
held in prisons or detention centers" as of 18 November 1988.?' It is
apparent, then, that the number of persons being held in a pre-trial and
trial phase has probably doubled in the first part of 1989.
The President of the Military Appeals Court also stated that some
2000 cases were tried in the military courts in May and June of 1989 to
alleviate problems posed by delays in reaching the plea and trial stages.
The Legal Adviser for the West Bank also acknowledged that when there
is an overflow of local detainees, such persons are sent to Megiddo (inside
Israel) and Ketziot (in the Negev desert inside Israel). Administrative
detainees (held without charges) are also sent "originally and initially" to
Ketziot. In Gaza, Ansar 2 can accommodate 1100 prisoners according
to the camp commander. No sentenced adults are in Ansar 2, members
of the mission were told, and they are sent to Ketziot to serve their
sentences.
According to the President of the Military Appeals Court, most of
those arrested for security offenses are "caught red handed" by soldiers
and are taken to the police. There the arresting soldiers give testimony
and the police ask those arrested for their reaction. The President of the
Military Courts in the West Bank added that in most cases the "confes-
sion" is taken by the police and that it can be written in Hebrew or
Arabic depending upon the abilities of the police. According to the
Legal Adviser for the West Bank, most interrogations are conducted by
the police.
This was confirmed by the military prison camp commander in
Gaza, who stated that most of the detainees there are brought in after
interrogation by the police, but those accused of more serious offenses
(such as firebombing or membership in an illegal organization) go to
Gaza prison for interrogation. Police interrogations can take place at the
Gaza military camp, with extremely small holding sheds and interroga-
tion rooms in sight and earshot of (and very close proximity to) military
prison facilities. Yet the prison camp commander stated that police in-
terrogations occurred outside his area of responsibility (and under the
responsibility of a police commander). We were told that some are ar-
rested elsewhere along the Gaza strip and do not arrive at the military
camp for some twenty-four hours. Yet a member of ACRI (the Israeli
Association for Civil Rights) in Tel-Aviv complained of the "loss" of
some persons in the Gaza area for "maybe two days" in a police station.
The ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) is also concerned
30. See supra note 4.
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about persons being held for long terms in police stations, apparently for
interrogation. In Gaza, some defense lawyers also complained of mili-
tary interrogations (and mistreatment or torture of arrestees) before the
police interrogations, even with respect to more ordinary security of-
fenses-but they added that young rock throwers are usually interro-
gated in the Gaza area quickly by the Army and that they are not
interrogated by the security services (the Shin Bet). The Advocate Gen-
eral of the IDF also confirmed that most security offenses are rather ordi-
nary (such as rock throwing) and that interrogations of such suspects
will be conducted by the police or military. More serious offenses, how-
ever, usually result in interrogation by the Israeli security services (the
Shin Bet).
Further, as the 1989 United States Country Report notes,
"[d]etainees are often not told the reasons for their detention."31 Pales-
tinian defense attorneys in Gaza reported that perhaps four to ten per-
cent of the arrestees get "written reasons" for their arrest and that since
the Intifada most are not even told why they are arrested at the time of
arrest or in the military camp before interrogation. The typical detainee,
according to these lawyers, first learns of the reasons for his arrest during
interrogation. The same attorneys stated that if an accused is arrested
close to the family, family members are not told why the person has been
arrested. Similar complaints are made by defense lawyers in the West
Bank, some of which appear in a formal statement of 1 January 1989,
addressing the reasons for a lawyers' strike earlier this year. 2 When
members of the mission interviewed the three minors held at Ansar 2 in
Gaza, each stated that they did not learn of the reason for their detention
until interrogation and the drafting of charges.
Additionally, under relevant military orders, it is possible to have a
"secret" arrest and detention of an individual for up to eight days. An
31. Id.
32. Lawyers' Strike, translated by the Arab Lawyers Committee. Another one-month
strike occurred on 20 July 1989. See, eg., San Francisco Chronicle, 21 July 1989, at A24, col.
3. A letter of 27 June 1989, from Attorney Jonathan Kuttab to the Jerusalem District Com-
mittee of the Israeli Bar added:
The elements of this situation have been the subject of repeated protests and com-
plaints which lawyers individually and collectively have presented to all the relevant
authorities, both verbally and in writing, repeatedly and over a long period of time
.... These conditions were also a subject of a written protest sent by attorneys on
14.5.88 to the relevant military authorities and to the Israeli Bar Association itself
warning that it will be impossible for us to serve our clients before these courts under
the prevailing conditions. These conditions were also detailed again in a statement
issued by lawyers appearing before military courts, consisting of 22 separate articles
of which I also enclose a copy as part of our reply.
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arrest can be kept secret for a period of ninety-six hours if authorized by
a military judge, for example, if demanded by "reasons of local security
or the interests of the investigation." Such a period can "be extended
periodically as long as the total of periods does not exceed eight days."33
In Gaza, the Legal Adviser informed members of the mission that a
judge reviews such orders after the first four days (l., after the first
ninety-six hours).
Earlier, complaints were commonplace that those arrested were
"lost" for several days or weeks. Still common are complaints from fam-
ily members and others that they do not know where an arrestee is taken
until notice of his whereabouts is obtained through contacts with other
prisoners and their families or attorneys, and this can still take days or
weeks. Military personnel do not notify families of an arrest, nor the
whereabouts of a detainee, a point complained about also in the West
Bank lawyers' strike statement of January 1989.
After twelve years, the ICRC was able to supplement such an infor-
mal network of information because of an agreement with the govern-
ment of Israel. Under the arrangement, the IDF is supposed to inform
the ICRC, within twelve days of arrest, of the name of any detainee, and
the ICRC is supposed to be able to visit each detainee from the territories
no later than fourteen days after arrest (and to see such persons without
witnesses). The Red Cross can then add the names to their computers
and the families can and do call to find out whether a relative has been
arrested or the whereabouts of such a detained person or both. Some-
times the family calls the Red Cross first in the hope that by giving the
name of their relative to the ICRC, the Red Cross can more easily affirm
needed information and obtain access to the detainee. In general, it is
assumed that the information network is accurate for Gaza but lacks
appropriate accuracy in the West Bank, perhaps due to less organiza-
tional effort by the military there or the existence of more secret arrests.
Once located, the ICRC can also visit a detainee up to two or three times
per week and information can be passed on to family members orally. In
Gaza, the prison camp commander indicated that the ICRC visits the
tents each week for one day, starting at 10:00 a.m., and that the ICRC
delegates can visit specific prisoners upon request two or three times per
week. Yet, the President of the ICRC has complained recently that there
are "a number of places of detention to which the ICRC does not yet
have access." 34
33. See Military Order No. 1220, § 78 d(a)l & 2 (1988).
34. ICRC, Bulletin No. 163, supra note 28, at 3.
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Military Order No. 1220 of 1988 finally provided families the right
to be informed "without delay" of the whereabouts of their detained per-
son, unless such person requests otherwise or, under Military Order No.
378 for the West Bank (or its equivalent for Gaza), there has been a
"secret" arrest. The Advocate General of the IDF stated that postcards
are now to be made available to every detained person from the time of
arrest and that these can be used (with free postage) by a detainee to
inform family members of his arrest and whereabouts. Members of the
mission saw and obtained one such postcard from the children's tents in
Ansar 2 (see Appendix A). The card is less than four by six inches and
has writing in English, Hebrew, and Arabic concerning sender and ad-
dress information on one side (including spaces for "Detainee no." and
"Identity card" number) and some ten lines for writing on the other side.
The Advocate General added that, under court order, the military would
have to disclose the name and whereabouts of any person detained by the
IDF.
The Legal Adviser for the West Bank stated that the cards are pro-
vided by the military not at the time of arrest but at the military prisons.
It had been left to each detainee to decide whether or not to fill out the
card, but about one month before the mission's visit the Legal Adviser
had instructed the prison commanders in the West Bank to assure that a
card was completed for each detainee. The instruction was repeated
about a week prior to the mission's visit. The Legal Adviser for Gaza
also stated that the cards are provided to each person once they reach the
military prison. He did not know what happens from the time of arrest
until the detainee reaches the military prison. He also indicated that the
prisoners usually only send out some thirty cards out of a thousand and
that they use them for recreation (e.g., to make playing cards), points
confirmed by the prison camp commander at Ansar 2 in the same detail.
A defense attorney in Gaza also stated that the cards are provided after
interrogation, although another defense attorney stated that he person-
ally had never heard of the existence of such cards or the sending of
letters. In seeming agreement, the prison camp commander at Ansar 2
stated that each prisoner receives a card when he arrives and that some
300 cards are given to each tent (with each tent housing some twenty-
eight people on cots). Members of the mission were told that in no case
had the guards misused the cards or denied the right of a detainee to use
such a card.
Members of the mission are not aware of the existence of any possi-
bility for a detainee to communicate with others by card, letter, phone, or
otherwise until after interrogation and arrival at a military prison camp.
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Phones are not available to a detainee even then. If interrogation is ex-
tended beyond fourteen days, however, the ICRC should be able to gain
access to a detainee, but not the detainee's lawyer or any member of his
family. The 1989 U.S. Country Report noted that family members are
not notified of detainee arrests and that attorneys "are actually not al-
lowed to see clients until after interrogations are completed." 5 The Re-
port added: "Officials at times have declined to confirm detentions to
consular officials who have inquired on behalf of nationals of their
countries."36
An encouraging development is the use by the IDF of computers to
track criminal files. Not only should the computers aid the military in
avoiding unnecessary hearing and trial delays, but use of computers can
also aid in the processing of detainees and proper notification to family
members. It is even possible for the IDF to process a detainee by name
and number, including (as the cards indicate) a detainee's identity card
number and address information, and to exchange this information with
the ICRC for more immediate networking with the families and their
attorneys. It should also be possible for the police to process and share
such information.
The Advocate General of the IDF seemed open to the use of com-
puters for more immediate notification to families and attorneys. He ex-
pressed some concern about the similarity of certain names, but use of
detainee numbers, identification card numbers, and other information
should be of help to both the military and those seeking notice of arrest
and the whereabouts of a detained person. Such information is vital to
the proper defense of those going to trial in a matter of days or weeks
after arrest and interrogation. The Legal Adviser for the West Bank also
stated that there are computers in each military prison but that the com-
puters are not yet linked "on line" and that information is brought twice
a week to a central terminal for access by others. At the Military Courts
in Nablus, there was also a recently installed computer system for track-
ing files, but the system was not in use when members of the mission
visited. Similarly, there was one computer in use in the court secretary's
offices in Ramaliah. In Gaza, members of the mission were told that all
detainees in control of the military were in the computer files and that
the secretary of the military courts places all files into a computer for use
there, including the name of any defense attorney known to be represent-
35. See supra note 4.
36. Id
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ing a detainee. In general, it was the impression of members of the mis-
sion that the military is much more organized along these lines in Gaza.
"Despite improvement in record keeping," the 1989 U.S. Country
Report added, "the authorities had difficulty keeping track of all detain-
ees."' 37 Defense attorneys also still complain about inadequate informa-
tion concerning the location of their clients, especially in the West Bank.
In general, there are numerous complaints of mistreatment or tor-
ture of Palestinians during the arrest phase (i.e., before interrogation).
Earlier, there had also been complaints of an official policy to mistreat
arrestees, including the "breaking of bones. ' 38 We were informed by Is-
raeli military officers that if such had ever been a policy it has been
stopped and that soldiers are being prosecuted for engaging in such activ-
ity in the past. Members of the mission, along with much of the world,
had seen instances of the "breaking of bones" on television prior to com-
ing to the Middle East, but we were unable to confirm or deny continued
reports of mistreatment at the time of arrest. Reports by other organiza-
tions confirmed earlier instances of excessive force and beatings, and
raised serious concerns about the lack of effective controls within the
Israeli military and the lack of adequate civil remedies and criminal sanc-
tions against perpetrators.39
While the mission was in the Middle East, a four year-old boy was
detained, with his father, in the West Bank and a date set for trial some
ten days later. The child had apparently made a "V" for victory sign and
cried out "PLO." The father might have had to pay a criminal fine for
the boy's actions (despite the fact that the child could not be criminally
responsible), but charges were later dropped.' The Legal Adviser for
Gaza told members of the mission that a MO allows the "control" of
parents because of the conduct of their children and that criminal fines or
37. Id See also Lawyers' Strike, supra note 32; Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,
Boycott of the Military Courts by West Bank and Israeli Lawyers 17-20 (Background Memo-
randum, July 1989).
38. See, ag., PUNISHING A NATION, supra note 27, at 23-32, 328-34.
39. See, eg., id.; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES:
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S CONCERNS IN 1988 (1989); THE PALESTINIAN INTIPADA-DE-
CEMBER 9, 1987-DECEMBER 8, 1988: A RECORD OF ISRAELI REPRESSION (M. Bassiouni & L.
Cainkar eds., 1989) 19-23 [hereinafter cited as PALESTINIAN INTIFADA]; 1989 U.S. COUNTRY
REPORT, supra note 4 ("There was widespread beating of unarmed Palestinians in early 1988
.... On 19 January the Minister of Defence announced a policy of 'force, might, and beatings'
to put down the uprising. He later said there was no policy of 'beating for beating's sake' and
that some soldiers were exceeding orders.")
40. See generally Al-Ittihaad, 25 June 1989 and 6 July 1989. A U.S. mother was also
arrested for three days, until U.S. intervention, because her three ycar-old daughter gave a "V"
sign near Ramallah. See San Francisco Chronicle, 21 July 1989, at A24, col. 3.
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bonds (or "guarantees"), after a hearing, are possible.41 He also indi-
cated that the matter is on appeal to the Israeli Supreme Court, having
been challenged, we were told, under precepts of democracy, prohibitions
against collective punishment, and Jewish values (e.g., the principle that
guilt must be personal). We also heard of the misuse of power in order to
arrest family members. For example, we heard that the identity cards of
parents had been taken in order to entice their children to come to police
stations or other facilities for retrieval, at which point they would them-
selves be arrested.42
Concerns, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Human rights law guarantees freedom from "arbitrary arrest or de-
tention."'43 In this regard, we are concerned about the broad range of
possible "security offenses" under Israeli military orders and the large
number of persons arrested for "security offenses" since December 1987.
We understand from several sources that the typical case involves alleged
stone throwing, but the recent case of the four year-old boy and his fa-
ther demonstrates how "arbitrary" and unfair arrests can be under the
circumstances. We have also heard allegations of arbitrary arrests in-
volving the arrest of any teenager in the vicinity of an incident, mass
arrests, and arrests for political purposes."
We propose that the IDF take its responsibilities more seriously
under human rights and Geneva law by refining in more detail the types
of security offenses it seeks to respond to, and that relevant IDF com-
manders and their legal advisers make greater effort to assure (through
directives, training and otherwise) that persons arrested are in fact rea-
sonably accused of having committed a security offense. The fact that
41. See, e.g., Military Orders Nos. 132 and 311 (West Bank Region), secs. 6 & 7; and
Military Orders Nos. 1235 (April 1988) and 1256 (27 Oct. 1988) (West Bank Region). Mili-
tary Order No. 1235 applies to conduct of "minors" under 12 years of age ("any person that
could not be convicted of criminal offences because of his age") which prosecutors consider to
be "a criminal offence and implies a threat to the security and public order in the area."
Parents who do not comply "shall face one year imprisonment" (art. 5) and can lose a posted
bond if the child commits another such act because, at that point, "the parent shall be consid-
ered as if he did not halt the minor from committing additional acts ... unless the parent
proves to the court that he has done everything possible to prevent the minor from committing
an additional act."
42. See also Lawyers' Strike, supra note 32.
43. See, eg., 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 9(1); Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, art. 9 (see also id., arts. 2, 3, 7, 10-11); 1950 European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 5; 1969 American Convention
on Human Rights, art. 7; see also G. C. arts. 41-43, 68, 78-79, 147.
44. See also PUNISHING A NATION, supra note 38, at 334-36; PALEsTINIAN INTIFADA,
supra note 39, at 32-33, 61-62.
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occupation has existed for some twenty-two years is an added factor with
respect to the need for greater normalization of offenses and arrest
procedures.
In this regard, we are also greatly concerned about the possible and
alleged misuse of power under Military Order No. 378 which establishes
procedures for arresting and detaining a person up to eighteen days with-
out access to a judge or lawyer. We find that such a procedure smacks of
potential impropriety in connection with both the arbitrariness of arrests
and delayed and improperly coercive interrogations. We recommend
that, as under ordinary Israeli law, no person be held without a judicial
warrant or formal charges and access to a court for more than forty-eight
hours. Under Article 71 of the G.C., accused persons must be
"promptly" informed, in writing, of the particulars of the charges against
them. We feel that the eighteen day procedure is generally incompatible
with the spirit of the Geneva requirement that accused persons be
promptly informed of charges against them and be treated with dignity
and given due process of law. Under Article 9(4) of the 1966 Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, anyone arrested or detained "shall be enti-
tled to take proceedings before a court in order that that court may de-
cide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his
release if the detention is not lawful." We feel that the eighteen day pro-
cedure is also incompatible with the spirit of Article 9(4) of the Covenant
and should be abandoned.
Under Article 9(2) of the 1966 Covenant, anyone arrested is to be
"informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest."'45 We have
heard numerous complaints that this is not done and we note that the
1989 U.S. Country Report declares that detainees "are often not told the
reasons for their detention.",16 We consider any such failure to be a vio-
lation of human rights law and we urge appropriate IDF commanders
and their legal advisers and police officials to take effective action in or-
der to assure compliance. We also request, as a humanitarian measure,
that families also be informed promptly of the reason(s) for the arrest of
a member of their family-if possible at the time of arrest and later when
a family member inquires or through expanded use of the postcards.
45. Such a requirement is mirrored in the 1950 European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 5(2); and the 1969 American Convention
on Human Rights, art. 7(4) (see also id. art. 7 paras. 3, 5, and 6). See also Al-Matawakal Said
Dachar Nazal v. The Military Court in Ramallah, et al., 726/88 (Israel High Court of Justice)
("It is proper to ensure.., that a detainee be given on his detention an accurate and detailed
statement of the reasons for his arrest.") (emphasis added).
46. See text, supra note 31.
[Vol. 14
Report of the ICJ Mission
Under paragraph 92 of the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treat-
ment of Prisoners,4 7 "[a]n untried prisoner shall be allowed to inform
immediately his family of his detention and shall be given all reasonable
facilities for communicating with his family and friends." Article 25 of
the G.C. also requires that all persons in occupied territory "shall be
enabled to give news of a strictly personal nature to members of their
families wherever they may be, and to receive news from them."
We also find the use of "secret" arrest procedures to thwart the dig-
nity of an accused and his or her family, and to smack of potential im-
propriety. Section 702 of the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States declares that a state violates customary international
law if it "practices, encourages, or condones ... [policies] causing the
disappearance of individuals." It is in the dark of secrecy that evil can
lurk. We are of the opinion that secret arrests are far too incompatible
with the rule of law and humane treatment to be maintained. We under-
stand that the inclusion of the military judge in secret arrest procedures
is probably meant to provide a check on impropriety, but we feel that
there is too great a danger of compromising the role of a judicial official
in a democratic society to maintain the practice of secret arrests.
For several reasons noted above, we also recommend that the ICRC
be given the names and whereabouts of all detained persons within forty-
eight hours of arrest and that the Red Cross be given access to all such
persons and earlier than fourteen days. We recommend that the same
sort of information be made available to any family member or appropri-
ate attorney or foreign consular official. In this regard, there should be
an adequate networking of police and military computers. We applaud
the use of postcards in the military prisons and the initiative of those
military officers who make sure that a card is filled out and sent for each
prisoner.
With respect to the location of detained persons, it is clear that cer-
tain Israeli practices violate the Geneva Conventions. Under Article 76
of the G.C., all those accused or convicted "shall be detained in the occu-
pied country, and if convicted they shall serve their sentences therein."
Thus, the detention inside Israel of arrested and convicted Palestinians
"protected by the... Convention" constitutes an "unlawful confine-
ment" within the meaning of Article 147 and a "grave breach" of the
Convention.
47. Adopted by the Frst U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders in 1955, approved by ECOSOC res. 663 C (XXIV) C, 24 U.N. ESCOR., Supp. (No.
1) 11, U.N. Doe. E/3048 (31 July 1957) and res. 2076 (LXII) (13 May 1977).
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Israeli practices of not separating pretrial and sentenced children or
juveniles also violates human rights law. Article 10(2)(a) of the 1966
Covenant requires the same segregation of accused from convicted per-
sons, "save in exceptional circumstances." With the passage of some
twenty-two years and the nature of most military prison facilities (e.g.,
tents separated by wire fences), we find no such "exceptional circum-
stances" to exist. Yet, from what we could observe, accused juveniles are
fairly separated from adults within the meaning of Article 10(2)(b) and
10(3) of the Covenant. Article 76 of the G.C. also requires that Israel
pay "proper regard ... to the special treatment due to minors."
With respect to the practice of punishing parents because of the con-
duct of their children, we recommend that such practices cease. We are
concerned that such practices may violate the customary prohibition of
collective punishment and the fundamental precept that guilt must be
personal, both of which are evident in the law of war and in human
rights norms.48 The same concerns apply to any misuse of parental iden-
tification cards or any coercive tactic practiced against the family of an
accused.
One need not stress that mistreatment of captured persons violates
both Geneva49 and human rights law.5" Any such violation of the law of
war is a war crime5 and a violation of Israeli military orders. 52 Criminal
prosecution of known perpetrators and those guilty of any complicitous
involvement should continue. Also, Israel is required to seek out and to
initiate prosecution of any person reasonably accused of such an of-
fense.53 Under both customary and treaty-based international law, civil
remedies should also be made available against perpetrators, complic-
48. For evidence of such, see, e.g., G. C. art. 33; Paust, Human Dignity As A Constitu-
tional Right: A Jurisprudentially Based Inquiry Into Criteria And Content, 27 HOWARD L.
REV. 145, 192-93 n.206 (1984). See also 1989 U.S. COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 4 (illegality
of practice of demolishing or damaging houses of families of a defendant-prohibition of col-
lective punishment); ICRC, Bulletin No. 164, at 3 (Sept. 1989) ("Collective punishment or
reprisals, as well as the destruction of property, is prohibited too, but dozens of houses have
been dynamited, bulldozed, or walled up.").
49. See, eg., G. C. arts. 3, 16, 27, 31-33, 147; Geneva Protocol I, art. 75 (4)(f) (1977).
50. See, e.g., 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 7, 10(l) and 14; Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, art. 5; 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 3; 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, art.
5; African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 5; 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THe
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 161, 164, § 702(d) (1987).
51. See, e.g., U. S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF
LAND WARFARE 178, § 499 (1956).
52. See Somer, supra note 16. Israeli soldiers are also under an obligation to refuse to
obey manifestly illegal orders.
53. Or, alternatively, to extradite such a person. See, eg., G. C. art. 146; Paust, Univer-
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itors, and those in positions of power who issued orders or policy state-
ments that a reasonable person under the circumstances would either
know or should know can lead to the mistreatment of arrested or de-
tained persons.54 Training of police and military should stress the impro-
priety of any cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment of such persons.
It would seem useful also to coordinate general training policy and ef-
forts concerning the arrest of captured persons with the ICRC in order to
gain objective supplemental guidance.
7. INTERROGATION
Following arrest, a detainee is usually interrogated by one or more
members of the military, police, or the security service (Shin Bet). Inter-
rogation can be either a one or two-step process depending on the nature
of an alleged offense and the interests of the military or security service
(Shin Bet). A more ordinary security offense may well involve interroga-
tion by the police. If the military or the security service personnel or
both interrogate a suspect, there will probably also be a more formal
interrogation by the police following the first interrogation.
The Advocate General of the IDF stated that there are basically two
types of interrogation: 1) regular, by the military or police; and 2) spe-
cial, by the security service. The Advocate General stated that during a
regular interrogation, the accused is told of his right to silence and that
the interrogator has to write down the fact that such a warning was given
to an accused. Once the police interrogate, it is apparent that an accused
is informed of a right to silence (but that silence can be used against him)
and that he has the right to an attorney. Such is written in a police
report of the police interrogation. We were told by defense lawyers,
however, that in the case of double interrogations, the subsequent police
warnings are irrelevant once the accused has "confessed" to the first set
of interrogators-that in such a case two confessions often occur, but
that only the confession "obtained" by the police (with appropriately re-
sality and the Responsibility to Enforce International Criminal Law: No U Sanctuary for
Alleged Nazi War Criminals, 11 Hous. J. INT'L L. 337 (1989).
54. On the fundamental right to a remedy, see, eg., 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, arts. 2(3) and 9(5); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 8; Paust, On Human
Right The Use of Human Right Precepts in US History and the Right to an Effective Remedy
in Domestic Courts 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 543, 611-28 (1989). Also, violations of international
law must not be entitled to any immunity. See, eg., Paust, iaL at 618-20, 634-36, 642 & n.579.
On complicity and command responsibility, see, eg., Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Nornm
Myths and Leader Responsibility, 57 MIL. L. REv. 99, 166-68, 175-84 (1972), and references
cited.
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corded warnings) is used at trial."
The Advocate General of the IDF also stated that a suspect is not
informed of his right to an interpreter during interrogation because the
interrogators must know how to speak Arabic. Attorneys from the Is-
raeli Association for Civil Rights (ACRI) affirmed that interrogations are
conducted in Arabic, but stated that most "admissions" (or signed "con-
fessions") are written in Hebrew, a language which most accused appar-
ently do not understand.5 6 Some Palestinian defense lawyers complained
that they had asked to have the confessions written in Arabic but that
this had "not been done."
Interrogation is functionally protected from outside interference. It
is during interrogation that most allegations of mistreatment and torture
occur and arrested persons are unable to consult with a lawyer or mem-
ber of their family. Functionally, they do not receive postcards for mail-
ing until after interrogation, and the ICRC may have access to a person
being interrogated, but only after the first fourteen days of interrogation.
Military Order No. 1220 mentioned the right of a detainee to see a law-
yer immediately after arrest, but such a practice does not occur. The
Advocate General affirmed that attorneys are not allowed to see their
clients before or during interrogation. The order also provides that those
in charge of an investigation can delay access to a lawyer for up to fifteen
days from the date of arrest "if he is of the opinion that this is necessary
for reasons of local security or if the good of the investigation demands
it." 57 It is even possible under the order to withhold access to a lawyer
for another fifteen days "if it is certain that this is necessary for reasons
of local security or if the good of the investigation demands it," and per-
haps for additional thirty-day periods.58 Nonetheless, "security" is of no
obvious importance under the orders, since another clause states that in
spite of such decisions "the head of the investigation shall allow the de-
tainee to meet a lawyer if the investigation has been concluded."5 9 Law-
yers do not normally see their clients until after interrogation (but can
55. See also AL-HAQ, supra note 24, at 14.
56. See also 1989 U.S. COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 4 ("which many defendants are
unable to read"); see also AL-HAQ, supra note 24, at 12, 14.
57. Section 78 c(c)l.
58. Section 78 c(c)2. See also section 78 d(b)3, 4. It is not clear whether Section 78 d(b)
allows an extension of such time beyond 30 days in any particular case or only when secret
arrests have been made, nor is it clear as to how long such a delay can be extended; but it
appears possible that 78 c(c)I & 2 allows 30 days, that 78 d(b)3 allows another 30 days, and 78
d(b)4 allows an additional 30 days (for a possible total of 90 days) if each condition is met.
59. Section 78 c(d). Thus, the investigation is of primary importance.
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before the charges are formalized),' and it is during interrogation, with-
out the aid of a lawyer, that the accused may first learn of the reason(s)
for his arrest.
In Gaza, when we interviewed the three fifteen year-old juveniles
held at Ansar 2, each boy stated (in front of the prison commander) that
he had been tortured or mistreated during interrogation. Each stated
also that he first learned why he was arrested during interrogation or
upon the filing of charges. We also saw a hearing involving a juvenile
who (as confirmed by the Legal Adviser for Gaza) was not interrogated
for the first twenty-four hours following arrest and who was informed
only during interrogation of the reasons for his arrest. He was charged
within forty-eight hours of arrest. The Legal Adviser added that perhaps
in more serious cases an accused is not told the reason for his arrest
because of the needs of interrogation.
The commander of the military prison in Gaza stated that most per-
sons arrested for security offenses in Gaza are brought to his facility after
interrogation by the police, in close proximity to his office and the tents.
He stated that those accused of more serious offenses go to Gaza prison
for interrogation. Also in Gaza, a military judge told members of the
mission that charges are prepared in most cases now within three or four
days of arrest, and that trials on the evidence occur within ten days in
many cases, and that eighty percent are finished in three months. A de-
fense attorney in Gaza stated that an attorney can see his client usually
within eight to ten days if the interrogation is over, and that ordinary
rock-throwing cases usually involve interrogation quickly by the army
and not the Shin Bet.
More generally, detainees who have not been thoroughly interro-
gated within eighteen days of arrest can receive an extension of detention
after a hearing before a military judge. The hearing on extension of de-
tention can take place within a prison, within a military court or else-
where. Defense lawyers often complain that extensions of detention
hearings usually take place in the prisons and without adequate notice to
counsel. The Advocate General of the IDF stated that defense lawyers
should be allowed to participate in such hearings, but there are other
problems posed for lawyers who do participate. It is reported that the
defense is not allowed full opportunity to respond during such hearings:
The police may show the judge some evidence but are under no obliga-
tion to show this to the defence. At this hearing the judge may ask the
60. See also AL-HAQ, supra note 24, at 12, 21; U.N. Special Committee Report, U.N.
Doc. A/31/218 (1976), p.62, para. 352.
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defendant for his response, and will record any indication of partial
confession. Any such submission is treated as a judicial admission for
the purposes of any trial that may follow. If the period initially
granted by the judge proves to be insufficient, it can be extended for up
to six months until a charge sheet has been drawn up.
6 1
Concerns, Conclusions and Recommendations
We are deeply concerned about the continuing reports of mistreat-
ment and torture during interrogation and the apparent desire to obtain
"confessions" from the accused.62 We are concerned that the Shin Bet is
apparently answerable only to the Prime Minister, but that the military
court system takes advantage of the fruits of interrogation by the police
or the Shin Bet. We do not agree with the camp commander in Gaza
that what occurs within a few feet of his area of formal responsibility,
under police control, is necessarily outside his area of personal and pro-
fessional responsibility. If one should have known of impropriety and
one could have taken some form of corrective action (even reporting to
others), one can be responsible in part for such impropriety. Similarly,
lawyers within the military (prosecutors or judges) must not allow
known or discoverable improprieties to take their effect within the mili-
tary justice system.63
The mistreatment or torture of an accused in occupied territory is
violative of human rights and the law of war and constitutes a criminally
sanctionable war crimeA" Israel, of all nations, must not tolerate such
illegality. Additionally, the Israeli military must not engage in a func-
tional complicity with the police or Shin Bet involving violations of the
law.65 Because of alleged abuses, we recommend that defense counsel
61. PUNISHING A NATION, supra note 27, at 337. See also AL-HAQ, supra note 24, at 10-
11, 19-21.
62. See, eg., 1989 U. S. COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 4; PUNISHING A NATION, supra
note 27, at 341-45, also quoting from the Israeli Landau Report of 1987; THE PALESTINIAN
INTIFADA, supra note 39, at 35-39; Quigley, International Limits on Use of Force to Elicit
Confessions: A Critique of Israel's Policy on Interrogation, 14 BIOOKLYN J. INT'L L. 485
(1988).
63. See also supra note 54; United States v. Altstoetter (The Justice Case), III TRIALS OP
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NURNBERG TRIBUNALS 3 (1950).
64. See supra notes 49-51. In particular, we disagree with any implication in the Israeli
"Landau Report" of 1987 that "moderate physical pressure" is to be tolerated under interna-
tional human rights law or, in particular, Articles 31 ("[n]o physical or moral coercion") and
32 (no "physical suffering") of the G. C. See also Quigley, supra note 62, at 485, 491-96. On
the impermissibility of coerced (or, indeed, use of any) confessions in older Jewish law, see I.
Rosenberg & Y. Rosenberg, In the Beginning: The Talmudic Rule Against Self-Incrimination,
63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 955 (1988).
65. See also supra note 54.
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receive adequate notice and play a more viable role during any extension
of detention hearings and that military judges conducting such hearings
assure that the accused are not subjected to mistreatment, and that they
ask relevant questions of each accused. As noted above, we also recom-
mend that attorneys be given access to an accused at an early date and
that no person be held without a judicial warrant or formal charges and
access to a court for more than forty-eight hours. If many of the accused
are now charged within three or four days, we feel that interrogation
periods can be limited. Under the circumstances, extended or delayed
interrogation seems to serve only to coerce.
We also recommend that interrogation take place only in police sta-
tions and military prisons and that, within occupied territory, all such
places be under the direct control and supervision of the military. We
recommend that no military personnel engage in actual interrogation and
that only professional police interrogators or the Shin Bet perform such
roles under the supervision of and training by the military.
We are also of the opinion that the denial of interpreters during in-
terrogation poses problems for an accused, whose answers to questions
(or whose silence) may be recorded and used against him, and that such a
practice violates Article 72 of the G.C., which states: "Accused persons
shall, unless they freely waive such assistance, be aided by an interpreter,
both during preliminary investigation and during the hearing in court."
The interrogation, as part of the investigation and effort to produce con-
fessions, is clearly part of a preliminary investigation within the meaning
of Article 72. In particular, we recommend further that all signed con-
fessions be written in a language which the accused readily understands
or be ruled inadmissible.
8. CONFESSIONS
Confessions have clearly been part of the military justice system and
the interrogation process seems to operate with the goal of producing
confessions, documented finally by the police, for use in the plea and trial
phases. We have heard that some ninety-five percent of the alleged se-
curity offenders "confess." 6 In Gaza, a military judge told members of
the mission that over ninety percent have confessions but that, today, far
fewer admit guilt at the plea and trial phases. There are different pat-
terns emerging however at different times and places. One West Bank
66. See also 1989 U.S. COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 4 ("The great majority"); see also
AL-HAQ, supra note 24, at 11-12, 28; PALESTINIAN INTIFADA, supra note 39, at 63; R.
SHEHADEH, supra note 1, at 87; Quigley, supra note 62, at 488.
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military judge told us, for example, that prisoners from Megiddo rarely if
ever confess because other prisoners might kill the person who does con-
fess. An attorney in Gaza also stated that within the last few months
before our visit some forty percent refuse to take part in any confession.
Also in Gaza, a military judge stated that fewer serious crimes now have
confessions.67 Similarly, the military in the West Bank may be more in-
clined to charge some stone throwers caught "red handed" on the basis
of military witness testimony, without a signed confession;6 but there is
still a "confession" in most cases.
On the other hand, most defense lawyers complain that once there
has been a signed confession, given the "normal" delays in the military
justice system, and that the defense attorney's "hands are tied," the for-
mal hearings are generally proper but "just a show." Defense lawyers
still complain that most "confessions" are the result of mistreatment or
torture, but that they are forced to accept guilty pleas because of even
more delays in the system before one gets to a hearing "on the evidence."
Prior to such a hearing there can be a "small trial" or mini-hearing on
the propriety of the confession, but defense lawyers complain of the near
impossibility of convincing a judge to rule against military witnesses and
the documented police checklist (which contains a set of warnings to an
accused during police interrogation).69
According to military prosecutors and judges, the burden of proof
concerning the voluntariness of a confession is on the prosecutor and
confessions must be corroborated by "something else." Defense attor-
neys complain, however, that the "something else" can be de minimus
and that, according to military decisions, it can come from "within" the
confession itself, for example, because it seems to be reasonable and with-
out inconsistencies.70 Amnesty International has been concerned that
confessions are received with little or no corroboration and that such a
process provides little or no protection against mistreatment during
interrogation.71
67. We were also told by a prosecutor in the West Bank that murder cases must go to trial
on the evidence.
68. See also PUNISHING A NATION, supra note 27, at 345.
69. See also id.; AI-Haq, Briefing Paper No. 12 (1988); see also AL-HAQ, supra note 24, at
28-29.
70. See also AL-HAQ, supra note 24, at 29; Jenin case, file no. 2091/75, in Selected Judg-
ments of the Military Courts, vol. D, p. 209, 211; Pach, supra note 1, at 244-45.
71. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF AN AM-
NESTY INTERNATIONAL MISSION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL, 3-7 June
1979, including the Government's Response and Amnesty International Comments 43 (1980).
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Again, most confessions are still written in Hebrew, a language
which most accused do not understand.
Concerns and Recommendations
We are deeply concerned about the continuing reports of mistreat-
ment and torture during the interrogation and "confession" processes.
Coerced confessions are impermissible under human rights and Geneva
law. 2 Efforts should be increased to assure that such mistreatment does
not occur and that coerced confessions play no role, even indirectly, in
the military justice system.
We are also concerned that there may not be enough corroboration
of confessions under military law. Given the history of coerced confes-
sions and the fact that under both human rights and Geneva law an ac-
cused has the "right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty,"'7 3
there is a need for greater inquiry into the voluntariness of confessions
and corroborating circumstances, not less.
Again, we also recommend that all confessions be written in a lan-
guage which the accused readily understands or that they be rendered
inadmissible. Further, as explained below, we are deeply concerned
about the inability of defense lawyers to visit clients until after interroga-
tion and the "confession."
9. CHARGES
Formal charges are usually prepared after the arrest, interrogation,
and "confession" of a suspect. Defense attorneys complain that the
charges, often a few sentences added to a standard form, do not provide
adequate specification of facts and that they are often unable to obtain
details until the time of the hearing on the plea (if then). It is also stated
that in many instances the accused learns of the formal charges through
the defense attorney, often at the first hearing on the plea.74
In Gaza, the Legal Adviser stated that with respect to ordinary of-
72. See supra notes 49-50, 64.
73. See, eg., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 11 (1); 1966 Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, art. 14 (2); 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 6(2); 1969 American Convention on Human Rights,
art. 8(2); African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 7(l)(b); G. C. art. 71 (together
with Pictet, supra note 8, at 354); Geneva Protocol I, art. 75(4)(a), (e), & (g); see also 1953
U.N. Supplemental Rules of Criminal Procedure for Military Commissions of the United Na-
tions Command, rule 32 ("The accused shall be presumed innocent until his guilt is established
by legal and competent evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.").
74. See also AL-HAQ, supra note 24, at 25-26.
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fenses they try to get the charge sheets out within twenty-four hours, but
a military judge in Gaza stated that such charge sheets are out on aver-
age in three to four days after arrest. One defendant that we had seen
had been charged within two days. A legal officer in Gaza also stated
that the accused often gets the charges in court and through his attorney,
but that in quick trials (in a few days) this is "prompt." In one case in
Gaza (on 3 July), the defense attorney claimed that he did not receive the
charges until that day although the accused was arrested on 6 May. The
prosecutor did not deny such and the military judge postponed the hear-
ing for three weeks to a month. In another case, sentencing was post-
poned because the charges were not clear as to whether or not relevant
acts allegedly occurred in 1987 or 1988.
Defense attorneys also complain that some of the charge sheets are
not translated into a language which the accused can understand, that
some twenty percent are not translated in Gaza, and that the problem is
worse in the West Bank. In Ramallah, a military judge stated that trans-
lation of charges into Arabic is not automatic for minor offenses, but that
it is for major offenses, adding that increased workload and other admin-
istrative difficulties added to such problems. In Nablus, a military judge
confirmed that minor charges are not translated, but added that interpre-
tation services are available and that he was aware of no major com-
plaints in this area. In the West Bank (file no. 4563), defense counsel
complained that the charges were only in Hebrew, that he learned only
the day of the hearing on the plea that the defendant was charged with
murder, and that he had not had sufficient time to study the file. Accord-
ing to counsel, the military judge refused to delay the proceedings for
more than two hours.
A captain and lawyer in charge of translation services in Gaza told
members of the mission that defense attorneys, upon request, can get any
document translated into Arabic. A defense attorney in Gaza stated that
he knew where the translators were but that there were not enough. Yet,
whenever he asked for a postponement because of a translation problem,
it was granted. The captain in Gaza added that when the file comes in to
the secretary of the court it is put into the computer, a date is set for the
first hearing (on the plea), and the name of an attorney known to repre-
sent the accused is also entered. He knows personally some ninety per-
cent of the fifty (out of some 332) lawyers who often practice in the
military courts in Gaza, and he tries to handle their problems daily.
Concerns, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Article 71 of the Geneva Civilian Convention requires that all ac-
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cused "be promptly informed, in writing, in a language which they un-
derstand, of the particulars of the charges preferred against them."
Pictet adds: "The nature and grounds for the charge must be notified to
the accused without delay; the protected person must know the reasons
for his arrest in time to prepare his defence. The notification must give
full particulars in a language the person concerned can understand and in
writing... ."I' Articles 9(2) and 14(3)(a) of the 1966 Covenant mirror
these requirements by requiring that anyone arrested "shall be promptly
informed of any charges" and informed "in detail in a language which he
understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him.'"76
It is obvious that Israeli military officers have not complied fully
with the requirements under Geneva and human rights law that the ac-
cused be informed personally and promptly, in writing, in a language
which he understands, of the particulars of charges against him." In-
forming an accused through his lawyer at or near the hearing on the plea
is hardly adequate "time to prepare his defense." We are also concerned
that there is insufficient "detail" or "particulars" to comply with due
process requirements in all cases and recommend the use of more de-
tailed charges and specifications.
We also recommend that more translators be assigned to the courts
so that Israel, after some twenty-two years of occupation, is more able to
fulfill its obligations under Geneva and human rights law. We recom-
mend further that all defense lawyers be made aware of translation serv-
ices offered and that these services, especially in the West Bank, be
checked periodically.
10. ATTORNEY NOTICE, VISITS, AND TIME
TO PREPARE
As noted above, attorney access to clients is severely limited by the
processes of arrest and interrogation, and in some cases can be denied for
weeks and months. Under Military Order No. 1220, detainees are sup-
posedly entitled to see a lawyer immediately after arrest. However, as
noted above, there are two fifteen-day provisions which can lead to an
extended denial for thirty days,7" and there are other orders authorizing
75. See PICT=T, supra note 8, at 354. See also G.C. art. 146 (in connection with G.P.W.
art. 105); Geneva Protocol I, art. 75(3) and (4Xa); see infra note 76.
76. See also 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, arts. 5(2) and 6(3)(a); 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, arts.
7(4) and 8(2)(b); 1953 U.N. Supplemental Rules of Criminal Procedure, rules 22(a) and 25(a).
77. See also supra note 74.
78. See text, supra notes 57-60.
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secret arrests. Lawyers do not see clients until after interrogation.
Defense attorneys complain that they are not always allowed rea-
sonable access to their clients prior to a hearing or able reasonably to
communicate with clients they do see, nor do they always have adequate
time and facilities for preparation of the defense of clients. Sometimes
they have to wait for hours outside a facility and then have only a few
minutes to communicate with each client.79
Rules are set by different base commanders as to when a lawyer can
visit, how long, with or without guards, and so forth. In Gaza City at
Ansar 2, lawyers are apparently allowed to see clients for one hour per
week, as worked out in part by an agreement with the local bar associa-
tion. Even then there can be problems getting through the gate. The
camp commander at Ansar 2 affirmed that visits are controlled in ac-
cordance with an agreement whereby some ten to fifteen lawyers are ad-
mitted each day to see some 120 to 150 prisoners (or about ten prisoners
each), most times at a separate place. We saw one of the defense attor-
neys seated at a table with his client outside one of the buildings at the
camp. At Ansar 2, there is supposed to be a new building built for attor-
neys to meet with clients, but there were delays in contracting out for
such a building. When asked who built the camp commander's air-con-
ditioned office, he stated that it had been built by the army. A military
judge in Gaza stated that if he knows that a lawyer is having difficulty
seeing a client at Ansar 2 he will phone to ensure access. The Legal
Adviser in Gaza stated that the Ansar 2 commander is under orders to
allow attorneys access and that one sees them in the camp moving
around and signing up clients (also to obtain a "power of attorney"
needed to view files located in the court complex).
Defense lawyers also complain about the lack of timely and accurate
information concerning hearings. In Nablus, defense attorneys com-
plained about notice from a book in the office of the court secretary and
that some dates for hearings were left blank. We saw attorneys using
such a book in Nablus. There, attorneys also complained that they must
talk with clients in a crowded hallway in the court complex because their
room for such courthouse visits was taken for a computer (which was not
yet in operation). They also complained that they can't use the tele-
phone. The President of the Military Court in Nablus stated that a pub-
lic telephone will be installed and that he is open to the Lawyers
Committee and to individual complaints. A military judge in Gaza
stated that he is also open to talking with attorneys, and the President of
79. See also Lawyers' Strike, supra note 32.
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the Military Appeals Court stated that he finds it important to talk with
defense lawyers and the court judges, and that he schedules meetings on
a regular basis at 5:00 p.m., one day every two weeks. A military judge
in Ramallah added that he asks local lawyers to talk with him and had
met twice with members of the Arab Lawyers' Committee in the last
three months. He also stated that soon in Ramallah defense lawyers will
have a building or room to meet with clients. At one point in Ramallah,
we saw a woman defense attorney whispering with her client while lean-
ing against the wall outside the packed one-judge courtroom, within sight
and some ten feet of two military guards.
The Legal Adviser in Gaza was aware of the letter from Gaza de-
fense attorneys early in 1989 (in February), but had already had a three-
hour meeting with about five attorneys representing the bar association
to work on problems (on 3 April 1989). He stated that defense attorneys
have access to him, being out in the halls a few yards away to check
posted lists in Arabic of clients (names and detainee numbers) and hear-
ing dates, and that they can also call on the phone or see his deputy and
six other officers who are available (in rooms off of a long hallway on the
second floor where the defense lawyers were seen by members of the mis-
sion checking postings or files). A local defense lawyer acknowledged a
series of meetings and the posting of "next week's trials" and added that
he works with the secretary to reschedule dates. Another such lawyer, a
representative of the bar association, stated that lawyers see a weekly list
which the lawyers publish in a newspaper. He added that the process is
still difficult for lawyers with several clients, especially visits in the
prisons.
In terms of adequate time to prepare a defense, the Advocate Gen-
eral of the IDF stated that the military has had problems orchestrating
witnesses (especially reservists), accused, and files, but that more speedy
trials, within forty-eight hours, are posed as a solution. The Legal Ad-
viser in Gaza admitted that there had been quick trials because of prior
massive arrests. This was confirmed by other military lawyers. One
judge in Ramallah, while berating defense counsel for arguing in English,
allegedly for "propaganda" purposes (in front of members of the mis-
sion), added in open court that in his opinion trial delays are for the
benefit of the defense lawyers because they are not always prepared. 8°
Concerns, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Article 11(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights guaran-
80. This occurred on 28 June 1989, in Ramallah.
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tees the right of all persons to a "trial at which he has all the guarantees
necessary for his defence." Such guarantees obviously include the right
to adequate representation by counsel of one's choice and adequate time
and facilities to prepare for a defense. As Article 14(3), subparagraphs
(b) and (d) declare, an accused has the right "to defend himself in person
or through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he
does not have legal assistance, of this right;" and, among other relevant
rights, "[t]o have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his
defence and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing." 81 Para-
graph 93 of the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners adds that an untried prisoner shall be allowed to apply for legal
advice "and to receive visits from his legal adviser with a view to his
defence and to prepare and hand to him confidential instructions." The
U.N. rules also state that interviews "may be within sight but not within
the hearing of a police or institution official."
Article 72 of the Geneva Civilian Convention expresses these guar-
antees as follows: "They shall have the right to be assisted by a qualified
advocate or counsel of their own choice who shall be able to visit them
freely and shall enjoy the necessary facilities for preparing the defence."8 2
Pictet adds in his commentary:
The defending counsel must be given ... all the facilities and freedom
of action necessary for preparing the defence. Above all, he must be
allowed to study the written evidence in the case, to visit the accused
and interview him without witnesses and to get in touch with persons
summoned as witnesses.
It will not always be easy for these rules to be observed during an
occupation, in view of the psychological atmosphere, but they must
nevertheless be observed scrupulously in all circumstances and in all
places.8 3
Importantly, the Geneva Convention also adds a notification re-
quirement tied to due process guarantees outlined in Article 71.
Although the notification requirement is expressed in terms of notifica-
tion to a "Protecting Power," which Palestinians do not have under the
circumstances, the notification requirement sets a minimum standard of
three weeks notification. Article 71 states that such notification shall be
81. See also 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, art. 6(1) and (3); 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, art. 8(2)(c),
(d), and (e); African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 7(l)(c) ("right to defence").
82. See also G. C. arts. 3(l)(d), 49, 76, and 146 (in connection with G.P.W. art. 105) and
147; Geneva Protocol I, art. 75(4)(a).
83. See PiCTET, supra note 8, at 356-57.
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at least "three weeks before the date of the first hearing" and that
"[u]nless, at the opening of the trial, evidence is submitted that the provi-
sions of this Article are fully complied with, the trial shall not proceed."
The three weeks notice provision includes notice of the accused, place of
detention, specification of the charge or charges, and the court, place,
and date of the "first hearing." These provisions obviously relate to re-
quirements that defense attorneys have adequate notice of charges and
time to prepare a defense.
We find it informative of general expectations in this area that the
1953 U.N. Supplemental Rules of Criminal Procedure for Military Com-
missions of the United Nations Command in Korea contained similar
requirements. Rule 26 stated that defense counsel were to have "the rea-
sonably necessary facilities to prepare the defense of the accused" and
"may, in particular, freely visit the accused and interview him in private"
and "also confer with any witnesses for the defense, including prisoners
of war." Rule 27(a) set a limitation on commencement of proceedings
"of at least three weeks from the date of the receipt by the accredited
Delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the prisoners'
representative, and the accused of the notice required" elsewhere to such
persons; and Rule 27(b) set another minimum time limit with respect to
defense counsel: "No trial shall commence until the Advocate or Coun-
sel conducting the defense on behalf of the accused shall have had at his
disposal a period of at least two weeks to prepare the defense of the ac-
cused." It is also informative in terms of due process standards that at
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, defense counsel were
given at least thirty days to prepare a defense. It is also instructive that
Article 146 of the G.C. declares that "[i]n all circumstances, the accused
persons shall benefit by safeguards of proper trial and defence, which
shall not be less favourable than those provided by Article 105 and those
following of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prison-
ers of War of August 12, 1949" [GPW], since Article 105 of the GPW
provides "a period of two weeks at least before the opening of the trial"
as a minimum time "to prepare the defence."
We are concerned that there have been violations of each of the
above-mentioned standards in the past. In particular, we are deeply con-
cerned about the denial of access by counsel for some fifteen or even
thirty days after arrest, the denial of the right of counsel under Article 72
of the G.C. "to visit ... freely" with an accused, the denial of adequate
facilities for attorney visits at military prison camps, the denial of ade-
quate facilities for attorney visits and preparation at the military courts,
and the denial of adequate time for the preparation of a defense. "Quick
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trials" within a few days (or even a week) of formal charges pose a spe-
cial problem for an adequate defense and, in our opinion, violate a mini-
mum of three weeks notification requirement found within Article 71 of
the G.C.
As noted above, we have recommended far earlier access by counsel.
We also recommend that more uniform rules concerning attorney visits
be set after coordination with local bar associations or committees by the
Advocate General and his staff. Defense counsel must be allowed to
"visit... freely" with an accused and have the time to prepare a defense.
In this regard, we also recommend that the Advocate General ensure
that no hearing on the plea occur until after an accused has had notice of
three weeks of the formal charges against him and, if represented by
counsel, that counsel of his choice has had at least three weeks to prepare
a defense.
Further, we recommend that the willingness of both military and
defense professionals to explore problems and find solutions be nurtured
through regular contacts, at various levels. We are impressed by the de-
sire of persons like the President of the Military Appeals Court to sched-
ule biweekly meetings and we feel that such contacts can aid both sides in
solving problems like the need for adequate facilities for the preparation
of a defense. We are left quite unimpressed with excuses concerning de-
lays in the construction or provision of defense facilities when the army is
capable of providing air-conditioned offices for others.
11. FAMILY VISITS
Family visits to detained persons are obviously limited by problems
encountered in locating an arrested person. There are also no family vis-
its until after interrogation. Family visits also appear to be limited by
various area commanders and are not so frequent or lengthy when al-
lowed. There are frequent delays at the gate and, in Ramallah, argu-
ments with the guard at the gate.8" We do not know how families could
visit their accused in the case of "quick trials" (in two to four days from
the time of arrest).
In Ansar 2 in Gaza, family visits are generally allowed to each pris-
oner once every two weeks for fifteen to thirty minutes in a new visiting
building (with plastic sheets with finger-sized holes between them). Vis-
84. Lawyers'Strike, supra note 32, adding: "The relatives... stand before the gates of the
detention centers without any care for their human and physical need for many hours waiting
for visits which may or may not materialize. Frequently the authorities prohibit all relatives
from visiting detainees which is a form of continuous and collective punishment .... "
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its are limited to the two parents of a prisoner or the wife and two or
three children if the prisoner is married. In the case of the Negev, Ansar
3, families are generally physically too isolated from their accused, a mat-
ter protested against by the ICRC and the United States in connection
with the movement of detained persons outside of the occupied
territories.
In some military courts, for example in Ramallah, the few family
members allowed inside the military compound might also be able to talk
briefly with their accused outside the court just after a hearing. In Gaza
City and Nablus, we saw no such practices. In all courts visited, we saw
family members sitting on the three or more rows of benches provided.
There were near silent gestures or brief communications at this point, but
far less in Gaza City and Nablus where the courts are a bit more formal
or controlled. One sensed feelings of concern, closeness, quiet comfort-
ing, and even pride among family members. The audience in a military
court typically was composed of fathers and mothers of juveniles, mili-
tary witnesses, and guards. In all cases, noise from family members was
controlled far more than noise from fellow soldiers (or even fellow
guards). We saw no toilet facilities for family members.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Again, we recognize that movement of detained (or sentenced) per-
sons outside occupied territories is a violation of Article 76 of the Geneva
Civilian Convention. We also recommend that, after some twenty-two
years of occupation, family visit procedures be more uniform and consis-
tent with Israeli practices inside Israel. We urge especially that visits to
unsentenced prisoners and to those below eighteen years of age be more
frequent than once every two weeks.
We also recommend that the court guards, especially in Gaza City,
show more respect for family members. Respect for fellow human beings
does not have to interfere with the ability to maintain needed formality in
a court setting. We recommend further that adequate public toilet facili-
ties be made available in all military courtrooms and at prison visiting
areas.
12. REVIEW AND DISMISSAL BY THE PROSECUTOR
Prosecutors, with Legal Advisers, have authority to "close files,"
and thereby dismiss a case. The Legal Adviser for the West Bank stated
that the file goes to the prosecutor after interrogation and that a prosecu-
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tor can recommend the closing of a file because there is insufficient evi-
dence or the matter is too minor to justify a trial.
Files are also to be checked from time to time and prosecutors are
instructed to look for undue delays before trial (e.g., for six months) and,
in such cases, to initiate a request for release. Computers allow the mili-
tary to "flag" a file delayed more than six months. The Legal Adviser
also stated that sixty-five people were released the day before our visit
because the charges involved stone throwing and the accused had been in
prison at least six months. A military judge in the West Bank stated that
more than ninety-five percent are held less than six months in pretrial
(although two months earlier such was a problem) and that those held
four or five months will be placed in the "head of the line" for trial, as
well as minors and persons with medical problems. He added that he
"can't deny it's a long line" and that "it's a problem." Defense attorneys
argue that prosecutor dismissals, even at the request of defense counsel
near or at the first hearing, are very rare.
If delays are long enough to lead to the release of an accused, the file
might not be closed; there may merely be a "stay" of proceedings. Fur-
ther, as explained below, delays may only result in a temporary release
on bail.
Concerns and Recommendations
Both human rights and Geneva law require that an accused be tried
without undue delay. Article 9(3) of the 1966 Covenant recognizes the
right of anyone arrested or detained "to trial within a reasonable time or
to release." Article 14(2)(c) also affirms the right to trial "without undue
delay,"'8 5 while Article 71 of the G.C. speaks of trial "as rapidly as possi-
ble." Article 10(2)(b) of the 1966 Covenant also requires juveniles to be
"brought as speedily as possible for adjudication." Such rights have to
be balanced with the circumstances of an occupation and the right of an
accused reasonably to prepare a defense, but the main concern is re-
flected in part by Pictet's commentary: "This provision is of the utmost
importance in time of occupation when delays ... may tend to prolong
the period spent under arrest awaiting trial."'8 6 This problem is particu-
larly evident when those awaiting trial or the first hearing spend as much
time in prison as the average sentence would require with respect to the
charges filed. Defense counsel in the West Bank claim that this is often
85. See also 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, arts. 5(3), (4), and 6(1); 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, art.
7(5) and (6); African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 7(l)(d).
86. See PicTET, supra note 8, at 354.
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nearly the case, L a, that one accused of rock throwing (with an average
sentence of six months) typically serves several months in "pre-trial"
prison before the plea hearing, and that attorneys often accept guilty
pleas under such circumstances so that their clients do not end up serv-
ing even more time awaiting a trial on the evidence. Perhaps this is one
reason why acquittals after a trial on the evidence are so rare (some five
to seven percent. according to a military judge in Ramallah). We saw
hearings concerning a number of accused who had been in prison for
months before the first hearing on the plea, and others who had been in
prison many months due to delays in trial.
We recommend that files be closed on all persons who have been in
prison awaiting the first hearing longer than half the average sentence for
the offense charged, and that efforts continue to use computers to "flag"
fies outstanding more than six months. Thus, we also recommend that a
review of files take place far earlier. In addition, we recommend that
those who have not been brought to trial within six months be "flagged"
and released unless delays are due to defense requests.
13. BAIL
Defense counsel complain that bail is rarely granted, even after sev-
eral delays in reaching trial, 7 that they have difficulties even getting a
hearing on requests for bail, 8 and that the amount of money set is often
so high that neither an accused nor his family is able to pay such. They
also complain that the denial of bail serves to coerce defendants to plead
guilty, since they are forced to stay in prison while hearings are set and
inevitable delays occur.
The Advocate General of the IDF stated that once an accused is
released on bail he is "gone" (meaning, of course, that the military then
is unable to locate the accused). The President of the Military Appeals
Court stated that military instructions exist to release on bail those who
have been waiting a "long time;" a military judge in the West Bank
stated that if an accused has been in prison more than six months the
prosecution does not always object to release on bail and that generally
these persons return. We saw young prisoners in court who had been
released earlier and several whose requests in court for release on bail
were denied although they had been in prison for several months.
87. See also Lawyers'Strike, supra note 38; see also AL-HAQ, supra note 24, at 17-18; Civil
Rights Group to Check Situation in Area's Prisons, Jerusalem Post, 8 Jan. 1988.
88. See also Lawyers' Strike, supra note 32.
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Recommendations
We recommend that bail be granted more frequently and that re-
lease on bail after three months become common. We find no right to
release on bail as such in the laws of war, but given a military occupation
for some twenty-two years, we find the situation closer to that contem-
plated in Article 9(3) of the 1966 Covenant, which states: "It shall not be
the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody."
The amount fixed for bail should not be so relatively high as to effectively
deny bail.
14. HEARING ON PLEAS AND "THE DEAL"
As noted previously, members of the mission were informed by mili-
tary officers and defense counsel of the high percentage of confessions
followed by guilty pleas made during the first formal hearing on the plea.
We were told that, in general, some ninety percent plead guilty in the
military courts, as compared with about eighty percent in the ordinary
Israeli courts. In fact, most of the hearings that we observed involved
pleas of guilty by an accused.
In such cases, there is often a "deal" made with the prosecutor with
respect to punishment, either at the hearing or before the hearing on the
plea. We witnessed such deals being made just before the start of a hear-
ing or even while the hearing was in progress as files were brought up by
the military judge. We had the impression that military judges mostly
approved such deals, although at times the judges sought greater or lesser
punishment, the latter usually at the request of defense counsel who
would also argue other points about delays in procedure, family
problems of the accused, the approach of holidays, and so forth. No real
restrictions of defense counsel were observed during these processes and,
in fact, some judges seemed rather tolerant of the deal-making proce-
dures during the initial stages of the day's hearings. Defense counsel
were generally able to speak with their clients in the courtrooms or, as
explained earlier, just outside, while apparently considering "deals."
The main complaint of defense lawyers is that "the deal" is unrealis-
tic or coerced because of the circumstances surrounding the process (for
example, coerced confessions, missing files, other delays in hearings and
a final trial on the evidence, and the inability to counter military witness
testimony). We are convinced that delays in reaching the first hearing
and a trial on the evidence add undue pressure on the accused to accept a
deal, especially as time in a military prison approaches an average sen-
tence for an alleged offense.
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We are also concerned that some judges add to the coercive nature
of the process by claiming that they will "reduce a detainee's sentence if
the defendant pleads guilty." 9 One member of the mission attended a
hearing on pleas in Ramallah during which a military judge advised de-
fense counsel to obtain guilty pleas, not because trials on the evidence
will result in greater penalties, but because guilty pleas can result in
lesser penalties.
15. SENTENCING ON GUILTY PLEAS
If a guilty plea is accepted, the defendant is usually sentenced at the
hearing on the plea. As explained by Al Haq and the Gaza Centre for
Rights and Law (in connection with sentencing at this hearing or after a
finding of guilty following a trial on the evidence):
[B]oth prosecution and defence may address the court on the question
of sentence. For instance, the prosecution is likely to present the court
with details of firstly the detainee's previous convictions, secondly ag-
gravating circumstances in the detainee's case and thirdly comparable
cases in which the court imposed a harsh sentence. Whereas the de-
fence, in its plea of mitigation, may adduce evidence on the detainees
character, health, economic situation or other special circumstances,
as well as details of comparable cases in which the court imposed a
lenient sentence. 0
We saw examples of such requests being made in Gaza, Nablus, and
Ramallah, and the military judges usually gave extended oral findings or
bases for their judgments.
We were also told that an average punishment for stone throwing
could be four months (if there was no damage), but that such had been
increased to eight months, each with other portions of time as a sus-
pended sentence and each with a fine. We saw such penalties being im-
posed, especially six month penalties, but we also witnessed the sentence
of a young first-offender to three months imprisonment (with an addi-
tional nine month suspended sentence and a fine of 500 Israeli shekels),
partly because of the age of the accused and a showing of repentance.
It has been claimed that military judges "have an unofficial sentenc-
ing 'tariff' which they apply more or less rigidly," 91 or that they follow
instructions of superiors as to sentencing or both. We observed the pass-
ing of somewhat different sentences and were told by military officers
89. See also AL-HAQ, supra note 24, at 31.
90. Ia at31.
91. See id at 32.
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that there are no such instructions (which would interfere with the inde-
pendence of military judges). Nonetheless, it is not contested that since
the Intifada, average sentences have increased.
16. TRIAL "ON THE EVIDENCE"
If there is no confession and plea of guilty or the confession is re-
voked, the trial is postponed for taking evidence. In most of these cases
witnesses are to be heard. These witnesses are mostly soldiers who were
involved in the arrest of the accused. A high percentage of the soldiers in
the occupied territories are reservists who are in the territories only a
limited time. This leads to the problem in practice that the soldiers, hav-
ing finished their active duty, are not available when trials or hearings are
scheduled. Often the summons is disobeyed by such witnesses because
they are not willing to come back to the territories. Thus, many trials are
postponed several times with the consequence that delays occur while the
accused remains in a military prison. The Advocate General admitted
that the orchestrating of witnesses and files and the postponements are a
problem.
In general, military authorities affirmed that they are not interested
in having these delays, which aggravate the workload, and stressed that
they are looking for effective methods to assure that all witnesses are
brought before the courts within a reasonable time after the arrest of an
accused. One defense lawyer complained that for 27 March 1989, one
military judge in Ramallah had a list posted concerning sixty-seven files
set "for Mention" (or a hearing on the plea), two files set for bail hear-
ings, and seventy-three files set for trials on the evidence, adding that "of
those fourteen (ten for Mention and four for Evidence) had a star indi-
cating (according to the secretary) that the file of the Court was not
found" and would not be taken up that day. We saw several cases
delayed and cases which had been delayed for various reasons. Again,
we are concerned that there be no undue delays in violation of Geneva
and human rights law.92
Military trials are in principle open to the public, unless closed ses-
sions are required in the opinion of the court for security reasons or for
"the defence of morals or the well-being of a minor." 93 Yet there are in
reality several limitations on access by the public and, as explained ear-
lier, by family members. In particular, only limited access is allowed into
the military compounds, and courtrooms cannot accommodate many of
92. See text, supra notes 85-86.
93. See Military Order No. 378.
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the relatives of the number of accused tried on a given day. Lawyers,
however, seem to have easy access through the military gates. In one
case, the father of an accused who had not been admitted by gate guards
was brought in by the order of a judge after a request by the defense
counsel.
All trials are conducted in Hebrew with simultaneous translation
into Arabic (and vice-versa). Sometimes a judge spoke partly in Arabic
and even in English during our visits. As noted by Al Haq and others:
"The detainee has the right to translation and may object to an inter-
preter and request a replacement."94 Such is required by Geneva and
human rights law." In one case, we witnessed the waiver of a translation
by a defense lawyer.
In general, we noticed no undue restrictions of defense counsel dur-
ing hearings in open court. The procedures followed in the courtroom
appeared satisfactory and, in some cases, correct. Both prosecutors and
defense counsel seemed to be familiar with the procedures. In one case,
it was observed that an intelligence officer was cross-examined in some
detail and was allowed to continue answering questions that had gener-
ally been repeated by the defense. During a military trial (as opposed to
hearings on administrative detention) there is to be no use of secret
evidence.96
i7. OPERATION OF THE MILITARY APPEALS COURT
An important change in the military justice system began in April
1989 with the creation of the Military Appeals Court.97 The Court of
Appeals was established following a recommendation of the Israel High
Court. The Court's seat is in Ramallah. It can hear appeals from all
Military Courts in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Prior to April
1989, the accused had no right to appeal to a higher court but only had
the right of petition to the IDF commander of the region, who had au-
thority to pardon, reduce the sentence, or order a new trial.98 As the
94. See AL-HAQ, supra note 24, at 27.
95. See, eg., G.C. arts. 72, 146 (in connection with G.P.W. art. 105); 1966 Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, art. 14(3)(f).
96. Others have missed this point. See Bisharat, supra note 2, at 365. Some members of
Al-Haq claim nonetheless that secret evidence has been used in such trials. Such claims are
denied by the Advocate General and other Israeli officers.
97. See Military Order No. 1265, Order Regarding Security Instructions (Amendment
No. 58, 1 January 1989).
98. See also art. 73, para. 2, of the Geneva Civilian Convention (right of petition "to the
competent authority of the Occupying Power"); see also PICTEr, supra note 8, at 369 (re. G.C.
art. 78 appeals "either to a 'court' or 'board'... [but] never [to] be left to one individual"); of
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mission was informed, such petitions had rarely been successful.
The Court sits as a court of three judges and, in special cases, (as
decided by the President or the Chief Military Prosecutor) as a court of
five. A judgment of a court of first instance from a three-judge bench can
always be appealed. A judgment from a single-judge court can be ap-
pealed if permission to do so was given in the body of the judgment or by
the President or the President of the Military Appeals Court. In this
context, "judgment" means not only all decisions concluding a hearing in
the first instance, but also other decisions (such as that to cancel the
charge).
The detainee-appellant will appear in person at the appeal-hearing
unless, having signed a waiver of appearance and a power of attorney in
favor of his lawyer, the defendant need not appear. Military lawyers will
only allow such if the defendant's sentence was relatively light and the
remaining portion of the sentence to be served is short (i.e., "only a few
weeks"). Nonetheless, according to relevant MOs, the detainee is not
present during consideration of a request for permission to appeal.
The Court of Appeals will not normally hear evidence, and it may
send a case back to the court of first instance for a rehearing. The mis-
sion also was informed that a reformatio in peius is a restraint, (i.e., if
only the accused has appealed for a decrease in punishment, an increase
of the penalty is not allowed). Prosecutors, however, can appeal in cer-
tain instances. It should also be mentioned that military judges were in
favor of the establishment of the Appeals Court. They expect that some
standards will be set, especially on sentencing, and that there will be a
contribution to unification of jurisdiction in the framework of an in-
dependent military judiciary.
The members of the mission were informed that by 5 July 1989,
forty requests for appeals had come to the Court, twenty-two from Mili-
tary Courts in the West Bank (nineteen from defendants and three from
prosecutors) and eighteen from the Gaza Strip. Altogether thirty-two
requests for "permission" came from the defense and eight from the
prosecution. By then, not all of those requests had been checked for
"permission" by the President, but of those finished, the President had
granted seven from defense requests and one from the prosecution re-
quests (out of seventeen requests). On 27 June 1989, we saw a hearing
before the Appeals Court in Ramallah on whether an appeal should be
granted, during which three defendants and their families were ade-
G.C. art. 146 (in connection with G.P.W. art. 106-right to appeal "in the same manner as the
members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power").
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quately cautioned to seek a lawyer. Such a hearing was conducted in a
professional manner. Yet in practice there is an apparent boycott of the
Appeals Court by Arab lawyers. Since no cases proceeded to a full ap-
peal before the Appeals Court, the mission cannot make remarks con-
cerning the Court's exercise of jurisdiction. However, it seems that by
the establishment of the Appeals Court, Israel has made an important
step toward fulfillment of the generally accepted principles of interna-
tional law.99
18. ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT
Residents of the occupied territories have the right to bring petitions
to the Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as High Court of Justice, relating to
measures and decisions of the occupying power. There is no such rule in
the written law, but the Israeli Supreme Court recognized this right very
soon after the occupation, when petitions were first brought to the Court.
Since that time, the High Court has in fact dealt with a great number of
petitions brought by residents of the occupied territories (ag., some 180
in the last two years).
Until the establishment of the Military Appeals Court, recourse to
the High Court was the only possibility to obtain a revision of a military
court's decision by a higher court. Indeed, the intervention of the High
Court is still limited to a procedural review, which leads in practice to
the result that the Court generally overrules a military court only if a
gross violation of the law or abuse of discretion is found.
As mentioned above, the Military Appeals Court was established
following a recommendation by the High Court. The subject matter of
the judgment was a petition filed in 1985 by two West Bank residents
who had been convicted by a military court and who had complained
about the absence of any right of judicial appeal. The High Court did
not follow the objections of some of the IDF authorities. It rejected, in
particular, the argument that a court of appeal "would undermine the
efficiency of the military justice in the territories," and it noted inter alia
that the right of appeal is "essential to a strengthening of the rule of
law." With this point, we agree."°
In our discussion with Palestinian defense lawyers, objections
99. See art. 73, paras. 1 and 2 of the G.C.; art. 14, para. 5 of the 1966 Convenant on Civil
and Political Rights; art. 2(1) of the European Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; art. 8(2)(h) of the 1969 Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights; art. 7(1)(a) of the 1981 African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights.
100. See also supra note 99.
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against this decision were frequently expressed, and against the establish-
ment of the Military Appeals Court. But it could be noticed that the
objections were directed against the existence of military justice on the
whole and not against a right of appeal as such.
It must also be mentioned that very often such lawyers complain
that the Israeli High Court has assumed a competency concerning the
occupied territories. The reason for this complaint is, without doubt, the
fear that a prolongation and maintenance of the occupation could
thereby occur. It cannot be denied also that an expression of the Presi-
dent of the High Court, made in a discussion with the members of the
mission might also be understood to support such fears, The President
stated that after a certain period of o'ccupation, a "normalization" of jus-
tice and an equalization among the residents should ensue and, therefore,
the Palestinians in the territories must also have the right to bring claims
to the High Court.
It was not possible for the mission to deal extensively with all rele-
vant questions, especially political questions, but we recognize that in-
volvement of the High Court can be quite important concerning respect
for the rule of law and the protection of fundamental human rights. 1' 1
19. ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION
Administrative detention (internment) is a procedure by which gov-
ernmental authorities detain individuals without charges and without ju-
dicial trial. The practice is surprisingly too common. According to the
International Commission of Jurists, at least eighty-five countries had
legislation permitting internment and many of them utilized it in the
early 1980s.112 Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations obligates a bel-
ligerent occupant to take all necessary measures to maintain security,
public order, and the civil life of the population, 'while Article 27 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention (G.C.) reads: "... . the Parties to the conflict
may take such measures of control and security in regard to protected
persons as may be necessary as a result of the war."
It is within this legal framework (and, more specifically, the require-
ment of necessity) that an occupant is authorized to adopt administrative
detention. Thus, according to G.C. Article 78, "[i]f the Occupying
Power considers it necessary, for imperative reasons of security, to take
101. With respect to civilian-judicial oversight, see also H. STERN, JUDGMENT IN BERLIN
(1984); United States v. Tiede, Crim. Case No. 78-001 A (U.S. Court for Berlin, 14 March
1979), 85 F.R.D. 227 (1979), reprinted in 19 I. L. M. 179 (A.S.I.L. 1979); Paust,,An Introduc-
tion to and Commentary on Terrorism and the Law, 19 CONN. L. REV. 697, 721-35 (1987).
102. ICJ Newsletter No. 24, January/March 1985, at 53.
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safety measures concerning protected persons, it may, at the most, sub-
mit them to assigned residence or to internment" (emphasis added). The
G.C. then covers the procedure in question in considerable detail in its
Articles 42-43, 49, 68 and 78-135. The emphasis on the need for impera-
tive reasons of security was affirmed by President Shamgar of the High
Court of Justice when he held in Ibrahim Al Hamid Sejira et aL v. The
Minister of Defence,"03 that administrative detention was "a ... step
which the law permits only under circumstances in which it is absolutely
necessary because of definite security reasons" (emphasis added). We
agree that whenever detention is not necessary (either generally or with
respect to specific individuals), it is unlawful."°4
It should also be noted that under Article 133 of the G.C., intern-
ment "shall cease as soon as possible after the close of hostilities." Such
reflects the general international view that internment is of possible im-
portance during the early (first post-hostilities) months of belligerent oc-
cupation, but not thereafter. Israel's continued practice of administrative
detention has therefore become the subject of extensive criticism as being
illegal,"05 and thus, also a "grave breach" of the G.C. under Article 147
(as an "unlawful confinement of a protected person").
We did not have an opportunity to visit the Ketziot Detention
Center which (to our knowledge) houses virtually all administrative de-
tainees, but we discussed administrative detention with a number of Arab
defense lawyers and also received a considerable quantity of foreign and
Palestinian documentation both about the detention procedure and about
the Ketziot Center." 6 Members of the mission also interviewed a mili-
103. Israel High Court of Justice (H.C. 253/88, App. 14 August 1988, November 1988).
104. See also Paust, Political Oppression in the Name of National Securi: Authorioy Par-
ticipation, and the Necessity Within Democratic Limits Test, 9 YALE J. WORLD Pus. ORD. 178
(1982); see text, infra note 113.
105. See, eg., U.N. SPECIAL COMMITr EE REPORT, U.N. Doc. A/8089 (1970), paa. 110,
at 50, the annual U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS (especially
1977, at 39; 1978, at 637); U.N. Human Rights Commission, Resolution, Sec. 4(e), of 15 Feb-
ruary 1977; see also G. C. art. 6; see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ISRAEL AND THE OCCU-
PIED TERRITORIES: -ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION DURING THE PALESTINIAN INTIFADA
(June 1989). At least one member of the mission feels that "hostilities" between states is what
is referred to in Article 133, that such hostilities ended in 1967, and, thus, that the continued
practice of administrative detention is illegal. Another member of the mission recognizes that
hostilities between belligerents are covered by Article 2 of the Convention (and thus Article
133); that insurgent-"hostilities" may be implicated as well under Article 133; and that the
general status of some of the parties to the violence occurring inside Israel, inside the occupied
territories, and elsewhere is not so clear as to exclude the possibility that "hostilities" are still
occurring within the meaning of Article 133.
106. For a detailed historical analysis of administrative detention, see Emma Playfair, Ad-
ministrative Detention in the Occupied West Bank (Occasional Paper No. 1, Al-Haq/Law in
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tary lawyer (a lieutenant) in Gaza who stated that he personally reviewed
every file of those subject to administrative detention from Gaza.
Administrative detention, as applied by Israel in the occupied terri-
tories, is based on the British Defence (Emergency) Regulations of 1945
(Articles 108 and 111) and on a series of MOs issued by the Israeli De-
fense Forces (IDF). The rules of British origin were applied in the occu-
pied territories following the outbreak of the 1967 war. They were
replaced (in April, 1970) by Military Order No. 378 (Order Concerning
Security Regulations) together with its numerous amending orders.
Internal and external criticism led to the gradual abandonment of
internment, even while the process underwent procedural changes, and
in 1982 the then last remaining administrative detainee was released from
custody after almost seven years. Military authorities had by then turned
increasingly to the practice of restricting individuals to their towns, vil-
lages, or residences (See G.C., Art. 78).
Administrative detention was resumed on 4 August 1985 and was
applied primarily to "terrorists" when "security reasons" prevented the
disclosing of relevant information in a Military Court trial. The use of
administrative detention increased greatly following the beginning of the
Intifada on 9 December 1987, at which time an estimated total of fifty
persons was said to be administratively detained. By the time we arrived
in the occupied areas, some 5500 Palestinians had been subjected to the
practice, and of that total some 1500 were still in custody by the end of
June 1989, according to statements by a number of Palestinian defense
lawyers and the Legal Adviser of the West Bank.107
The actual procedures involved in administrative detention have, in
the course of time, undergone specific and significant changes through
both new and amended MOs. Initially, an IDF Area Commander could
order the detention of any person for not longer than six months, and
only for imperative security reasons. It should be noted, however, that
past and present .administrative detention orders are reported to be al-
ways issued on the basis of data in a file compiled by the General Secur-
ity Service (GSS), the Shin Bet. The arrest order is therefore issued at
the initiative of the GSS and the "evidence box" used recently in con-
junction with the GSS file during detention hearings also originated with
the Service of Man, the West Bank affiliate of the International Commission of Jurists, Ramal-
lah, 1986); PUNISHING A NATION, supra note 27, at 211-18; see also AMNESTY INTERNA-
TIONAL, supra note 105; 1989 U.S. COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 4.
107. See also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 105, at 1. A member of ACRI added
that the number is probably 1500 now. A lieutenant who reviews detention files in Gaza
thought the number was over 1000.
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the GSS. We were told by defense lawyers that both the file and the box
at times contain data gathered from Palestinian informers.
Detention orders are renewable for an indefinite number of six
month increments. The Area Commander could not delegate his author-
ity, but a District Commander could issue a detention order if he be-
lieved that his superior would have had reason to do so. An order of a
District Commander was valid for not more than ninety-six hours and
could not be renewed by him.
Limited judicial review of a detention order did exist under Military
Order No. 378, and in 1980 an expanded review and appeal procedure
was provided under Military Orders Nos. 815 and 1059 (for the West
Bank) and Military Orders Nos. 628 and 807 (for the Gaza Strip). A
detainee had to be brought before a legally-qualified military judge within
ninety-six hours after detention, regardless of the origin of his detention
order. The judge had to confirm or cancel the detention order or shorten
the length of detention. The order then had to be reviewed again by a
military judge not later than three months from the date of the original
confirmation, and that review had to be undertaken at least every ninety
days. Articles 87(C) and 87(B)(a) of Military Order No. 378 provided
that if either review failed to start within the specified time limits, the
detainee had to be released. The detainee had the right to appeal the
decision of the military judge within thirty days to the President of the
relevant military courts or to a military judge appointed by the latter. A
possible final appeal was to the Supreme Court of Israel sitting as the
High Court of Justice. It appeared to us that the appeal provisions cited
would have satisfied the requirements of G.C. Articles 73 and 78.
It is interesting to note, in connection with the reference to the
Supreme Court of Israel, (as Playfair pointed out),108 the Court, in Rabbi
Kahane et aL v. Minister of Defence (1981), °9 ruled that the issuing of an
administrative detention order is an administrative act even though it is
reviewable by the Supreme Court.
Military Order No. 815 of 1980 introduced a number of procedural
changes, such as the rule that a military judge reviewing a detention or-
der did not have to observe the normal rules of evidence if he believed
that such would help in reaching the truth. If such a deviation did take
place, it had to be recorded. The judge could also examine "evidence" in
the absence of both the detainee and his or her lawyer and did not have
to disclose the evidence to them if he believed that such a disclosure
108. See Playfair, supra note 106, at 23.
109. P.D. 35(2) 253, A.A.D. 1/80.
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would endanger state security or public safety. Adl review proceedings
had to be held in camera. The review hearings, always closed to the
public, involve a military prosecutor, a representative of the General Se-
curity Service, a legally trained military judge, the detainee, and the lat-
ter's lawyer.
During a hearing on an appeal, the reasons for the detention, stated
only generally on the detention order, are subject to scrutiny by the de-
tainee and his lawyer, as long as the reasons are not classified. Classified
or "secret" evidence is studied only by the judge. On completion of this
study, the judge's decision is made. The sequence of events is therefore
as follows: presentation of the army's unclassified arguments for deten-
tion; response by the detainee's counsel and the detainee if he or she so
desires; study by the judge of classified material, not in the presence of
the detainee and his or her lawyer; return of the detainee and his or her
lawyer to make additional comments if desired; and announcement by
the judge of his decision or of the date on which the decision will be
handed down.
According to Military Order No. 1229, every detainee is granted the
right to appeal, and according to Military Order No. 1236, Order Con-
cerning Administrative Detention (temporary) (amendment) (for the
West Bank, 1988), the appeal is to be brought before a military judge.
Military Order No. 1236 provides that any case of a person arrested
in accordance with an order from a military commander will undergo
judicial examination only after the person has presented an appeal and
when his appeal is heard before a judge. The length of time between
arrest and a hearing of the appeal is important, since it is only before a
judge that the detainee can state his claim to be released. By mid-August
of 1988, twenty-eight percent of the appeals heard resulted in release or
in a shortening of the term of detention. Justice Shamgar, in the Sejira
Case, supra, stated that an appeal should be heard at the most within two
or three weeks following the date of presentation of the first appeal of the
arrest or of a decision concerning extension of the detention. He opined
that if the number of detainees is large, additional judges should be used
to hear appeals.
On 17 March 1988, Military Orders Nos. 1229 (for the West Bank)
and 941 (for Gaza), the Order Concerning Administrative Detainees [In-
terim Provisions], introduced substantial changes in detention proce-
dures, presumably in consequence of the start of the Intifada. Authority
to issue detention orders for up to six months was extended to all IDF
officers with the rank of colonel or above; the quick automatic review of
detention orders was suspended; and detainees could now appeal to a
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three-member Advisory Appeals Committee, able only to make recom-
mendations to the Area Military Commander. The Advisory Appeals
Committee sat only between 1 May and the middle of June 1988, for on
13 June of that year Military Order No. 1236 was issued. The committee
was replaced by a single legally-qualified judge who passed on the de-
tainee's detention. Defense lawyers complained to us that this change
brought about an even greater lack of precise information at the deten-
tion hearings and that the hearings became too brief for any comprehen-
sive discussion of a given case, lasting normally only ten to fifteen
minutes. We were told by one of the defense lawyers that when attorneys
asked to see the evidence against their clients, such requests have been
denied routinely.' 10 Several Arab defense lawyers asserted, without doc-
umentation, that arrest warrants were no longer being issued, hence were
absent from detainees' files. One of the lawyers in question commented:
"Arrest was proof enough that the detainee had done something wrong,"
a statement somewhat reminiscent of one allegedly made by the Military
Governor in the well-known case of the physicist Taysir al-Aruri in 1974:
"It is not what he has done, but what he was thinking of doing." I I
Official figures stated that by 23 August 1988, more than 2600 ap-
peals from detention orders had been submitted and over 1400 had been
heard, with slightly over 400 orders having been reduced or cancelled. 1"
In 145 additional cases, the appeal process had been terminated when the
periods of detention had been shortened. Members of the mission were
also told in Gaza (by the lieutenant who reviews each file) that most
detainees from Gaza appeal their administrative detention. In addition,
detention is usually for three to four months (not six months) and exten-
sions are "very rare" (reportedly at twenty percent according to the 1989
U.S. Country Report, for 1988). About half of the detainees get out ear-
lier (for example, because of family reasons, which raised a question in
our mind why "security" reasons justified detention at all of persons who
could be released for "family" reasons). He also stated that he personally
110. See, eag., Abu Sarour, Abu Zeid, Abu Yassin v. IDF Commander in Gaza Strip and
IDF Commander in West Bank, High Court of Justice, 42/88, Petition of plaintiffs, on detain-
ees' lack of knowledge of the reason(s) for their detention. See also 1989 U.S. COUNTRY RE-
PORT, supra note 4. At least one military judge used the word "terrible" in connection with
the use of secret evidence.
111. See NATIONAL LAWYERs GUILD, TREATMENT OF PALESTINIANS IN IsRAE.i-Occu-
PIED WEST BANK AND GAzA: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LAwYERs GuiLD 1977 MIDDLE
EAsT DELEGATION 81 (1978). Al Aruri was finally deported to France on 27 August 1989,
after having appealed to the High Court of Justice and having claimed that he would be killed
if he were sent to Lebanon. See Duluth News-Tribune (Duluth, Minn.), 28 Aug. 1989, p. 5-A.
112. See AMNEsTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 105, at 7.
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would not approve administrative detention without charges of children
less than sixteen years-old.
We were informed by defense lawyers that currently two legally
qualified military judges separately hear appeals in the Ketziot Detention
Center, sitting five days each week and hearing, on average, 200 appeals
per week. We also were told by a defense lawyer, without substantiating
evidence being cited, that on a few occasions a military prosecutor, either
because of weakness in the evidence for trial or because of recalcitrance
of an arrested person, had asked a military court judge to dismiss the
case in question, and that then the military had the detainee placed (by a
detention order) in administrative detention. The lawyer in question
phrased it as: "in fact" the string was pulled by the Shin Bet, "in law" by
the Area Commander. Such practices were denied by members of the
IDF. It should also be stressed that one member of the mission feels
strongly that confirmations and subsequent extensions of administrative
detention by relevant military judges "acting as courts" but without tri-
als (and without charges and on secret evidence) constitute violations of
Article 71, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the G.C., which include the prohibi-
tion of any "sentence ... pronounced by the competent courts of the
Occupying Power except after a regular trial." The same member feels
strongly that such practices constitute "grave breaches" of the Conven-
tion within the meaning of Article 147, because -they include practices
"willfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular
trial prescribed in the... Convention." Additionally, since persons are
not prosecuted for these types of breach, Israel violates Article 146 of the
Convention, which imposes the duty "to search for persons alleged to
have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave
breaches" and to "bring such persons . . . before its own courts" or
"hand such persons over for trial to another" party to the Conventions.
The other members of the mission feel that such an argument must ulti-
mately be either against the permissibility of internment as such (which,
perhaps unfortunately, is permitted in accordance with Articles 27, 42-
43, 49, 68, 78 and 79-135 of the G.C.) or against an alleged practice of
willfully using internment as a substitute for the trial and sentencing of
persons subjected to internment. If the latter, the other members feel, we
simply have been unable to confirm that internment has been used (or
misused) in order willfully to deprive a protected person of the rights to a
fair and regular trial.
We believe that Israel's administrative detention practices include
violations of G.C. 78, according to the voluminous testimony available
from ex-detainees, defense lawyers, and existing literature. Mr. Jean
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Pictet, the official commentator on the Fourth Geneva Convention of
1949, held that internment under belligerent occupation should be an
exceptional practice: "In occupied territories the internment of protected
persons should be even more exceptional than it is inside the territory of
the Parties to the conflict... [S]uch measures can only be ordered for
real and imperative reasons of security; their exceptional character must
be preserved." 1 3 Pictet also commented that Article 78 relates only to
persons not charged with any offense, hence precautionary detention rep-
resents only preventative, not punitive, action.1 14 We also believe that
certain uses of administrative detention in the occupied territories have
violated certain standards laid down, for example, in Article 9 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, dealing with arrest
and detention, as well as Principles 11.2 and 32.1 of the Body of Princi-
ples for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on 9 December
1988, dealing with hearings and consultation with counsel. While it is
true that Israel has only signed but has not ratified the Covenant 1 5 and
the Principles are not a treaty, they represent standards or behavior
backed by an impressive proportion of the nations of the world.
The administrative detainees from the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip currently are held at the Ketziot Detention Center in the Negev
Desert. The Center was intended from its beginning in March 1988 for
administrative detainees from the occupied territories, as well as for con-
victed persons from the Gaza Strip. As previously noted, its location
outside of the occupied territories, in Israel proper, represents a clear
violation of G.C. Articles 49 (concerning internment) and 76 (concerning
persons "accused of offences" or convicted), which call for detention of
protected persons in the occupied territory. At one time, an IDF Chief
of Staff, General Dan Shomron, acknowledged this violation of Article
76.116 As such, it constitutes an "unlawful confinement" of protected
113. See Pictet, supra note 8, at 367-68 (emphasis added). See also text, supra note 103.
Cf 1989 U.S. COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 4 ("Israel defines 'security' very broadly, and in
many cases individuals appear to have been detained for political activities which the author-
ties regard as a security threaL Many individuals, including academics, journalists, and
human rights workers, who have not engaged in or advocated violence or other acts threaten-
ing security, have been detained... ."); see Bisharat, supra note 2, at 365-67.
114. See PiCTET, supra note 8, at 368.
115. See also supra note 20.
116. See NATIONAL LAwYERs GUILD, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RGHTS LAW AND
ISRAEL'S EFFORTS TO SUPPRESS THE PALESTINAN UPRISING (1988); see The Washington
Post, 3 June 1988.
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persons within the meaning of Article 147 and thus a "grave breach" of
the Convention.
As noted, we were unable to visit the Ketziot Detention Center, but
conditions at that installation have been described and criticized by sev-
eral defense lawyers as well as in the reports of other foreign missions
and in the news media. 17 Article 87(G) of Military Order Concerning
Security Regulations of 1970 was duplicated, even as the practice of ad-
ministrative detention was declining, by Military Order No. 378, Article
87(G), of 21 January 1982, which set forth a detailed list of provisions
concerning the conditions under which administrative detainees were to
be kept. The list covered many of the specific points listed in G.C. Arti-
cles 79-131.118 The weight of evidence supplied indicates that implemen-
tation of the 1982 Military Order has occurred, at best, only in part.
The following list, correlating reported conditions with the require-
ments laid down in the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, outlines our
great concern about compliance with G.C. standards at Ketziot: G.C. 76
(detention in occupied country and food and hygienic conditions at least
equal to those held in prisons in the occupied country); G.C. 78 (appeals
to be decided with least possible delay); G.C. 83(3) (detaining state to
provide support of dependents of detainees if such needed); G.C. 85 (ade-
quate hygiene and health facilities and protection against climate; ade-
quate heating and lighting; suitable bedding and sufficient blankets,
adequate sanitary facilities, sufficient water and soap for personal and
laundry use, adequate facilities for personal toilet and laundry, showers
or baths); G.C. 87 (canteens for the sale of food and needed articles);
G.C. 89 (food rations sufficient to keep detainees in good health, suffi-
cient drinking water); G.C. 90 (facilities to obtain clothing, footwear, and
other necessary items-if need be, to be provided by the Detaining
Power); G.C. 91 (an adequate infirmary under qualified medical staff);
G.C. 92 (monthly medical inspections, including, at least once a year, x-
ray examinations); G.C. 93 (religious services); G.C. 94 (encouragement
of intellectual, educational and recreational pursuit!;, sports, and games);
G.C. 98 (all detainees to receive regular allowances sufficient to purchase
goods and articles, such as tobacco, toilet requisites, and other incidental
items; such allowance may take the form of credits or purchase cou-
117. Id., at 55-69, with copious documentation; see PUNISHING A NATION, supra note 27,
at 378-82. See also 1989 U.S. COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 4. In the Sejira case, supra note
103, the Israeli High Court of Justice recognized in 1987 that the problem of overcrowding
"must be solved," and Justice Shamgar stated that he was unwilling to allow certain discipli-
nary measures found to be in use at Ketziot.
118. See Playfair, supra note 106, at 27-28, 43-51.
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pons); G.C. 100 (no prolonged standing and roll-calls, punishment drill,
or other similar procedures); G.C. 102 (election by secret ballot every six
months of a committee to represent detainees before the Detaining
Power, the ICRC, and any other organization which may assist them);
G.C. 106 (as soon as interned, or at least not more than a week after
arrival at place of detention-and in case of transfer to another place-
the right to send an internment card to family and to a Central Agency,
according to Article 140, informing them of his location; the cards not to
be delayed in any way); G.C. 116 (the right to receive visitors, especially
close relatives, at regular intervals and as frequently as possible); G.C.
128 (in the event of transfer, internees are to be officially advised of de-
parture and of a new address, in time to pack belongings and to inform
next of kin); and G.C. 133 (internment shall cease as soon as possible
after the close of "hostilities"). 119
Arab defense lawyers in Gaza asserted that one feature of practices
at Ketziot was particularly unfortunate: an alleged failure to notify the
lawyers of the location of detained clients. It was claimed that a lawyer
would arrive at the detention center with a list of, for example, fifteen
clients, but would be able to see only ten of them. The whereabouts of
the rest were said to be unknown to the center authorities. It was also
charged that in some instances clients were spirited to another detention
center before the arrival of their lawyers. Israeli military authorities de-
nied those charges, and in Gaza pointed out that computers were being
used increasingly to locate detainees.
20. QUASI-JUDICIAL TRIBUNALS
The Israeli military government in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip has created, since 1967, a number of quasi-judicial military tribu-
nals called Objections Committees. These bodies, staffed by military of-
ficers, handle a surprisingly extensive variety of civil matters in the
occupied territories.
As early as 1967, Military Order No. 172 established the first Objec-
tions Committee. Originally designated as an appeals tribunal against
decisions of the Custodian of Absentee and State Property, the jurisdic-
tion of the Committee has been expanded to the point that it now has
authority to hear cases in twenty-eight different categories.1 20 Some of
119. See also the detailed account of conditions at the Ketziot Center in A.M. Rosenthal,
On Prisons, Israel Is in The Wrong (taken from The New York Tunes), in the International
Herald-Tribune 8 July-9 July, 1989, at 4. See also 1989 U.S. COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 4.
120. See the complete list in R. SHEHADEH, OCCUPIER'S LAW-ISRAEL AND THE WEsr
BANK (1985 and rev. ed. 1988), 88-89 (in both editions).
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these involve appeals against decisions of the military government, but
others deal with matters originally within the jurisdiction of local courts
but subsequently transferred by MO to the Objections Committee. For
example, appeals against tax and customs duty assessments were shifted
by Military Order No. 406 to the Objections Committee.
Decisions of the Objections Committee represent recommendations
to the IDF Area Commander who may accept or reject them, with no
further appeal possible.
Similar committees have been created since 1967 to deal with spe-
cific civil matters. Among them are the Claims Committee (Military Or-
der No. 271, as amended), which considers claims for compensation
arising out of damages due to military operations certified by the Area
Commander as having been undertaken "because of security needs"; the
Objections Committee Concerning Vehicle Licensing (Military Order
No. 56); the Special Appeal Committee to hear appeals against regional
and road planning schemes; and the Special Committee under Military
Order No. 1060 (28 June 1983) Concerning Disputes over Unregistered
Land. The jurisdiction of the last named body had previously been
within the competence of local courts. 121
While the assumption of increasing authority formerly lodged in the
local courts represents an undeniable growth in the exercise of quasi-
judicial functions by the occupant, the Objections Committees do not
appear to us to constitute an integral part of the Israeli Military Court
System. Hence these quasi-judicial tribunals appeared to us to lie beyond
the mandate set fcr our mission. Similarly, Mr. Paul Hunt, author in
part of an Al-Haq study of the military court system, eschewed coverage
of the Objections Committees. 122 We therefore decided to exclude analy-
ses of the operations of these military bodies, even though A1-Haq had
suggested to the Secretary-General of the ICJ that the Objections Com-
mittees be included in the mission's study. It should be emphasized that
an investigation of even one major aspect of these committees, such as
land titles and land acquisition, would have entailed far more time than
was allotted to our mission.
One obvious issue posed by such an assumption of jurisdiction re-
lates to the requirement under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations that
the occupant must respect, "unless absolutely prevented, the laws in
force in the country" and, thus presumably also, the legal institutions in
such country. Under Article 64 of the G.C., it is recognized that "the
121. Id. at 33.
122. See AL-HAQ, supra note 24, at 2.
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tribunals of the occupied territory shall continue to function in respect of
all offences covered by the said laws," subject "to the necessity for ensur-
ing the effective administration of justice" and application of the Geneva
Conventions. ' 23
123. See also Picmr, supra note 8, at 335-36.
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APPENDIX B
References in International Instruments
Relevant to Selected Topics in the Report
(Excluding the Fourth Geneva Convention of
1949 and Geneva Protocol I of 1977)
Charges, etc. in a Language Understood by Defendant:
Covenant, Arts. 9(2), 14(3)(a)
American Convention, Art. 7(4), 8(2)(b)
European Convention, Arts. 5(2), 6(3)(a)
U.N. Supplemental Rules, Rules 22(a), 25(a)
Access to an Attorney:
Universal Declaration, Arts. 10, 11(1)
Covenant, Art. 14(3)(b) & (d)
American Convention, Art. (8)(2)(d) & (e)
European Convention, Art. 6(1) & (3)
African Charter, Art. 7(1)(c)
U.N. Supplemental Rules, Rules 25(c)(1) & (2), 26
Time and Facilities to Prepare:
Covenant, Art. 14(3)(b)
American Convention, Art. 8(2)(c) & (d)
European Convention, Art. 6(3)(b)
African Charter, Art. 7(1)(c)
U.N. Supplemental Rules, Rule 26
No Delay in Trial:
Covenant, Arts. 9(3) & (4), 14(3)(c)
American Convention, Art. 7(5) & (6)
European Convention, Arts. 5(3) & (4), 6(1)
African Charter, Art. 7(1)(d)
No Secret Evidence:
Covenant, Art. 14(3)(b) & (e)
American Convention, Art. 8(2)(f)
European Convention, Art. 6(3)(d)
U.N. Supplemental Rules, Rule 25(g)
Presumption of Innocence-Burden of Proof:
Universal Declaration, Art. 11(1)
Covenant, Art. 14(2)
American Convention, Art. 8(2)
European Convention, Art. 6(2)
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African Charter, Art. 7(1)(b)
U.N. Supplemental Rules, Rule 32
No Coerced Confession:
Universal Declaration, Art. 5
Covenant, Arts. 7, 10(1), 14(3)(g)
American Convention, Arts. 5(2), 8(3)
European Convention, Art. 3
African Charter, Art. 5
Convention Against Torture, Arts. 1(1), 2(2), 13, 15, 16
Challenge of Judge(s):
U.N. Supplemental Rules, Rules 25(f), 30
Right to Appeal:
Covenant, Art. 14(5)
American Convention, Art. 8(2)(h)
European Protocol No. 7, Art. 2(1)
African Charter, Art. 7(1)(a)
Identification of Instruments:
Universal Declaration: Universal Declaration of Human Rights
U.N. Charter: United Nations Charter
Covenant: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
American Convention: American Convention on Human Rights
European Convention: European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
African Charter: African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peo-
ples' Rights
U.N. Supplemental Rules: 1953 U.N. Supplemental Rules of
Criminal Procedure for Military Commissions of the United
Nations Command (Korea)
Convention Against Torture: Convention Against Torture and
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.
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